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STYLE SHEET

For the papers in English for the *Nirgrantha* Transliteration Conventions

For the papers written in English, words from Sanskrit, Ardhamāgadhī other Prakrits including the Apabhraṁśa, etc., will be diacriticised if rendered in Roman script. (Quotations can also be in the Nāgarī script). [Here we suggest those for the Sanskrit (classical), the Prakrit, the Apabhraṁśa, and the Dravidic languages. For other languages, namely, Arabic, Persian and the modem European languages, the current international conventions for transliteration for their rendering may be followed.]

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā
ई ī
ऊ ū
ए,ओ ē } (long)
आ ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ)

Nasals

Anusvāra
(ं) ṁ and not ṃ
anunāsikas
ङ् ṅ
ञ् ñ
ण् ṇ (or ṇa as the case many be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga
(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals
च ca and not cha
छ cha and not chha

Linguals
ट ṭa
ठ ṭha
ड ḍa
ढ ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants
श śa
ष ṣa
स sa

Unclassified
ऋ ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ऌ ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples
kṣmā and not *kshamā jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* not *Kṛṣḷṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha,*(except in Hindi)

Dravidic (*conjuncts* and *specific*) *character*
ள ḷ
ழ ḻ
ண ṉ
ற ṟ

Examples
Ilaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Chola), Munnuṟṟuvamaṅgalam, Māraṇ etc.

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaī* and not jāṇai
Seūṇa and not Seuṇa
Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Prëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation
For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the conventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dagaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *véve* and not *vev*
Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgari script. (The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhiviccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for *laghu-guru* of the syllables in a meter(when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, TiåCevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Authoris name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it): next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.

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Why Form is Structure?: A Reply to Renz

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Abstract

Graham Renz in his recent work "Form as Structure: It's not so simple" repudiates the reduction of Hylomorphism to Structuralism where the latter refers to the view that form is primarily the structure/arrangement of an object's parts. The primary motivation for this rejection is that at least in the case of mereological simples the role of form is not played by structure simply because such entities lack parts and consequently lack structure. Hence, for Renz, the notion of form is not "ontologically exhausted" by that of structure. However, this line of argument despite its initial plausibility has certain major shortcomings. One of the primary issues identified in this context is with reference to Renz's assumption that mereological simples arehylomorphic compounds. Consequently, it is argued that if simples are understood as being both metaphysically and mereologically simple, Renz's attempt to challenge structuralism, fails. On the other hand, it isargued that even if mereological simples are conceived as being hylomorphic compounds, the theory of structuralism can still be held onto at least in some capacity because even in such cases, form can be understood as structuring the matter of such entities. Hence, this paper seeks to show that in either case, there seems to be not enough reason to deny the reduction of Hylomorphism to Structuralism and therefore the "form is structure" conception can be accepted. Moreover, this sort of a counter-position to Renz has been developed primarily by taking into consideration Kathrin Koslicki'saccount of ordinary material objects wherein a hylomorphic and mereological analysis of objects is closely tied together.

Keywords: *Hylomorphism, Structuralism, Mereological Simples, Form, Material Constitution*

Introduction

There has been a recent upsurge in the number of hylomorphic analyses of concrete objects[1] especially in the discourses on the metaphysical relation of material constitution[2]. Despite the enormity of discussions that have surrounded it, for some thinkers the relation between a material object and its constituting matter still seems unclear. Mostly, there is an attempt to inquire into the nature of this relation with respect to the relation of identity. Simply then, the question is whether or not the constitution relation is an identity relation[3]. In order to respond to this sort of inquiry[4], Neo-Aristotelian thinkers like Kathrin Koslicki, Kit Fine and Mark Johnston[5] have attempted to re-introduce the metaphysical theory of "hylomorphism". Etymologically, the word "hylomorphism" comes from combining two Greek words namely, "hulê" and "morphê" which literally mean matter and form respectively. The term "hylomorphism" was first introduced by Aristotle in his discussions in the first book of *Physics*[6] primarily as a response to Parmenides' challenge against change.[7]In this context, Aristotle referred to two kinds of change namely, accidental change and substantial change.Furthermore, the former kind was said to involve the loss or acquisition of a property in a substance, whereas the latter was said to involve the creation or destruction of the substance itself.[8]Now it was particularly to account for substantial changes that Aristotle introduced the theory of hylomorphism. Simply put, according to Aristotle, every phenomenon of change involved

- Some substance which persists through the process of change
- Something which is lacking
- Something that is gained in the process of change

Furthermore, Aristotle explicitly held that while each of these aspects can be identified in instances of accidental changes, the same cannot be said for substantial changes. This is because in the latter case, by definition, there is no "substance" that persists through the process of change. Instead, according to Aristotle, what persists through such changes is the "matter" of the substance. Additionally, what is gained or lost in this process is the "form" of the object. Thus, Aristotle posited the theory of hylomorphism as the view that every object is best understood as a matter-form compound and in the process of substantial changes, it ismatter of the substance that persists while it is formthat is lost or gained.

Borrowing from this metaphysical theory of objects, recently there has been an inclination to understand matter as that which "constitutes" an object and form as that which in some sense "structures" the object. This is to say that form is understood as the arrangement or the structure exhibited by an object's parts. Now for Renz, this sort of a conception of form seems particularly limited in scope and thus must be rejected. For this purpose, he introduces the notion of mereological simples into his discussions

in order to establish that not all hylomorphic compounds have form as their structure. Consequently, he claims that the notion of structure fails to "ontologically exhaust"[9] the principle of form.

In this paper, an attempt has been made to show how Renz's argument is problematic on several grounds. Herein, the primary focus remains on a rejection of Renz's characterisation of mereological simples as hylomorphic compounds. For this purpose, reference is made to Kathrin Koslicki's account of material objects wherein firstly, the metaphysical and mereological analysis of objects is intertwined; and secondly, in this discussion Koslicki (like Aristotle) describes mereological simples as metaphysically simple entities (viz. they are all form and no matter). Thus, following Koslicki's discussion, it is argued that Renz wrongly assumes that mereological simples are hylomorphic compounds and thus, fails to posit any substantial argument against structuralism.Additionally, in this paper it is asserted that even if mereological simples are understood as matter-form compounds (without assigning them mereological complexity), form can nevertheless be understood as structure and hence, the reduction of hylomorphism to structuralism stands justified. In addition to this, in this paper, some of the general inconsistencies that can be identified in Renz's account as a whole have also been posited to ultimately highlight the failures of his account. Hencein short, the fundamental aim of this paper is to show that if Renz's argument against structuralism is rejected, the "form is structure" conception can be endorsed.Moreover, as mentioned previously, the argument offered in this paper has been developed primarily by taking into consideration Kathrin Koslicki's analysis of ordinary material objects[10].

Furthermore, this paper has been divided into three major sections. The first section posits Renz's argument against structuralism. The second section critically analyses his account by exposing its various shortcomings and inconsistencies. Lastly, in the third section, the "form is structure" conception is argued in favour of by referring to Koslicki'sanalysis of material objects, following which the final remarks are presented in the concluding section of this paper.

1. Renz on the "Form is Structure" view

Renz's primary claim in his work[11] is that the principle of form is not "ontologically exhausted" by that of structure. In other words, he rejects the view that form is merely the arrangement of an object's parts and so, there is something more to form than just structure. However, in order to establish this argument, Renz first sets out to briefly discuss the notions of "form" and "structuralism" itself. In his discussion of the notion of form, he states that according to the Aristotelian conception, form is the principle which dictates what kind of an object something is. In other words, form is what ascribes the nature, powers and capacities to an object.[12] Following this, Renz introduces "structuralism" as the view that an object belongs to a particular kind and also has the

powers and capacities that it does in virtue[13] of its parts exhibiting a certain structure. Thus, in such cases, the role of form is played by that of structure and so one may infer that form is structure.[14] He explicitly mentions Koslicki as a proponent of this view along with Jaworski, Fine, Johnston and Rea.[15]

Furthermore, although Renz asserts that to conceive of form as merely structure is mistaken, it does not imply that form is not structure in any case.[16] For instance, Renz recognizes that in the case of composite objects, form is instantiated as the structure/ arrangement of the object's parts. On the contrary, his argument is that if hylomorphism is offered as a metaphysical theory describing the nature and composition of "all" material objects, then a problem arises viz. there are certain material entities where form is not structure and hence, reducing hylomorphism to structuralism seems like an unwarranted move. The kind of material entities that Renz has in mind here are mereological simples. In its most ordinary conception, a mereological simple is defined as an entity that lacks proper parts[17]. However, Renz goes a step further and elaborates on the notion of simples by positing three possible views of simples namely, the Pointy view[18], the MaxCon view[19] and the Indivisibility view, out of which he assumes the latter as being the most plausible. On this view, simples are those entities that are metaphysically indivisible. Additionally, in his discussion of simples, he also points out that Aristotle himself rejected their existence.[20] However, Renz believes that if simples are understood as indivisible, material and extended natural bodies[21] that are metaphysically complex[22], then such entities can very well be accommodated within an Aristotelian ontology. Moreover, he goes on to argue that this metaphysical complexity of simples does not "threaten"[23] their mereological simplicity.

Now the "form is structure" conception becomes problematic with respect to such entities because by definition, they are mereologically indivisible viz. have no parts. If mereological simples have no parts, there cannot be any structure. Additionally, on the Aristotelian account of form, it is form in virtue of which some object has its kind, powers and capacities. In the case of composite objects, it is argued that structure plays this role. However, evidently, the same cannot be said about mereological simples. Consequently, if there is no structure in the case of mereological simples, then there must be something else in virtue of which the simple has its kind, powers and capacities. This implies that the principle of form is not restricted to the notion of structure and hence, hylomorphism cannot be reduced to structuralism. Infact, in Renz's words, form is a genus of which structure is only a species.

Formally then, Renz posits his argument against the "form is structure" conception as follows.

1. Hylomorphism posits that objects have their kind, nature, powers and capacities in virtue of the form they possess.

2. Structuralism holds that form is structure.
3. Mereological simples exist.[24]
4. Mereological simples belong to a kind and possess certain powers and capacities in virtue of belonging to these kinds.
5. Mereological simples, by definition lack proper parts and hence, possess no structure.
6. This means that mereological simples have their kind and powers in virtue of something else other than structure.
7. Thus, some material objects (like simples) have their kind and powers in virtue of something else other than structure.
8. Hence, form is not structure at least in the case of certain material objects.

In the following section, it is primarily this argument that has been critically analysed in order to reveal its various shortcomings.

2. The Failures of Renz's Argument

Despite the initial appeal of Renz's account, a focused analysis of his argument and underlying assumptions reveals significant philosophical difficulties. As mentioned previously, the aim of this paper is toidentify and discusseach of these difficulties. For this purpose, the following section has been divided into two parts. The first part is focused on a refutation of Renz's main argument against the "form is structure" conception, whereas the second part delves into a discussion of thegeneral inconsistencies that are identifiable in his account.

Following is the first part of the critical analysis. Here each of the eight premises of Renz's argument (which have been elucidated in the previous section of this paper) have been analysed and the difficulty with each of these premises if any, has been discussed.

1. The first premise of Renz's argumentintroduces the Aristotelian theory of "hylomorphism" which posits that all of an object's powers, capacities and kind properties are derived from an object's form. Although, there is nothing erroneous with this understanding of hylomorphism, it may be pointed out that while this premise is true, it is not completely true. For instance, from the perspective of Koslicki's account[25], all of an object's properties can be traced back to both its matter and form. This implies that while a certain set of properties such as physical and chemical properties are ascribed to an object in virtue of its matter, certain other properties such as kind properties, modal properties, existence conditions, aesthetic properties etc can all be traced back to the object's form.[26]

Following this line of thought, one may argue that although an object's identity and existence conditions are derived in virtue of the object's form, not all of its capacities are determined by it. For instance, take the case of a glass vase. A glass vase lacks the capacity to survive falling off the table (viz. it will break). This lack of capacity is jointly dependent on its matter and form. This is to say that because the vase is what it is, if broken, it will cease to be a vase. However, one may argue that the fragility of the vase is also grounded in the fact that it is made up of glass. Suppose the vase was made of some metal like silver, then the vase would possess the capacity to survive falling off the table (viz. it won't break). Thus, one may say that it is partly dependent on an object's matter, what powers and capacities it has. [27]

2. The second premise focuses on the notion of structuralism. Now here Renz does acknowledge the fact that this notion is based on the role of form in some hylomorphic compounds (viz. composite objects). Moreover, it is not the functionality of form per se that has been problematized by him but the view that the principle of form is ontologically limited to that of structure. He draws support for the latter claim from the fact that the functional role of form is not played by structure in all cases and hence, form cannot merely be structure. However, it can be argued that firstly, form's ontological status may not be restricted to its functional role and secondly, even if it is, structure does play the role of form in all hylomorphic compounds and therefore, form is structure. [28] This point has been further elaborated upon in the following passages.

3. The third premise of Renz's argument posits the existence of mereological simples.

   Now as Renz himself points out; Aristotle rejected the existence of such entities. Thus, for an Aristotelian, Renz's argument fails to be of any significance. However, even if one accepts that simples exist, it may be argued that Renz's conception of these entities seems particularly complex and problematic. This point has been elaborated upon in the following passages.[29]

4. The fourth assumption is that like composite objects, simples too have their kind, capacities and powers in virtue of something. On Renz's conception, this "something" is form in the case of both simples and composites although it is only in the case of the latter that the role of form is played by structure. Evidently, this premise rests on the view that even simples are hylomorphic compounds. However, this sort of a characterisation of simples leads to a number of serious philosophical troubles which have been discussed in the subsequent passages.

5. This premise holds that mereological simples lack proper parts. This is the most general way of understanding the notion of mereological simples and there

seems to be nothing particularly troubling with it. However, as mentioned before, Renz ascribes this mereological indivisibility to simples despite assuming a metaphysical complexity in them. Now significant troubles emerge here. Theoretically, in this context there are four possibilities available to Renz which are as follows.

- To accept mereological complexity based on metaphysical complexity in the case of all hylomorphic compounds. This is to say that since all hylomorphic compounds are metaphysical composites of matter and form, they have matter and form as their proper parts (at least on one principle of division).
- To accept mereological complexity based on metaphysical complexity in the case of composite objects only. This is the kind of claim that Renz seems to be making when he says that while both simples and composites are metaphysically complex, only the latter are mereologically complex.
- To reject mereological complexity based on metaphysical complexity in the case of all hylomorphic compounds. This is to say that one cannot assert that matter and form which compose an object are proper parts of it (on any principle of division).
- To accept metaphysical and mereological simplicity of simples. This is the kind of claim that Koslicki seems to make when she asserts that mereological simples are only form and not matter. Moreover, since they are not hylomorphic compounds the question of deriving mereological complexity from their metaphysical complexity does not even arise. Her views have been discussed at length in the following section of this paper.

Further more, significant difficulties arise in the case of the first three claims. These difficulties are as follows:

- If Renz accepts that all hylomorphic compounds (viz. simples and composites) are mereologically complex because they are composites of matter and form, then the very distinction between mereological simples and mereological composites collapses. This is because simples can no longer be defined with respect to the lack of proper parts and this conflicts with how simples are ordinarily understood in mereological discourses.
- If Renz accepts matter and form to be proper parts of only composite objects, then he faces the challenge of having to explain how in one case, metaphysical complexity leads to mereological complexity but not in another. Simply put, what makes matter-form to be (proper) parts of a composite object but not of amereological simple given that both are metaphysically alike?
- If Renz rejects mereological complexity based on metaphysical complexity in the case of all hylomorphic compounds then two major issues surface here. Firstly, this claim conflicts with Koslicki's account[30] which clearly establishes that since an object is a hylomorphic compound, both matter and form are proper parts of the object (at least on one principle of division). Thus, if Renz

intends to argue against such an established view, he must offer at least some argument to support his stance. In other words, Renz must explain why matter and form which compose an object cannot be understood to be its parts at least on one principle of division? Secondly, if matter and form cannot be understood as proper parts of either composite objects or simples, then the question is what kind of proper parts does a composite object have any way? Which kind of parts are to be understood as the proper parts of a composite object in a way that they satisfy the definition of proper parthood but are also not possessed by mereological simples?[31]

As a result, Renz must either choose one of the former three claims and adequately respond to its corresponding difficulties or else, like Koslicki, he must endorse the final claim viz. simples are both metaphysically and mereologically simple.

6. This premise holds that a mereological simple has its powers, capacities and kind in virtue of something but this "something" is not structure. Now a significant issue arises here. One can argue that if even a simple is understood as a compound of matter and form, it is difficult to ascertain why form cannot play the role of structure in simples just as it does in the case of composite objects. This is to say that even if a mereological simple is understood as not having matter and form as its (proper) parts, it is nevertheless, a metaphysical composite, as a result of which the theory of structuralism is still applicable to it at least in some capacity. In other words, one may argue here that what Renz is trying to demonstrate is that there are no "parts" to structure in simples but this does not imply that there is nothing at all to structure in mereological simples (viz. form can still be understood as structuring the matter of these entities). Moreover, the theory of hylomorphism explicitly holds thatit is form that brings about a material object into existence by structuring some pre-existing matter. As a result, one may claim that even if mereological simples are characterised as hylomorphic compounds, the role of form is to structure the matter of such compounds. In short then, either Renz must dismiss a hylomorphic construal of mereological simples (which renders his present argument useless) or accept that the "form is structure"conception holds true in the case of both mereological composites and simples.

7. This premise holds that mereological simples are material objects.[32] Furthermore, Renz's primary claim in this context is that since hylomorphism is a theory of all material objects and simples are material objects, this theory must be applicable to simples too. Additionally, since simples are hylomorphic compounds wherein presumably the "form is structure" conception does not hold, hylomorphism cannot be reduced to structuralism. Now it has already been shown that to conceive of a mereological simple as a hylomorphic compound is deeply

problematic. This leaves us with two possible conceptions of mereological simples: either they are all matter and no form or they are all form and no matter. Additionally, as mentioned previously, Koslicki (like Aristotle) seems to endorsethe latter characterisation.[33]

As a result, Renz's account can be refuted on three major grounds which are as follows:

- Firstly, he assumes that mereological simples are material objects. As pointed out before, this conflicts with the Aristotelian conception of simples.
- Secondly, since simples may be understood as being immaterial (as Koslicki does), hylomorphism as a theory is not applicable to them. In fact, in this paper, it has been argued that even if they are material, they cannot be hylomorphic compounds. In short then, mereological simples fall outside the purview of hylomorphism.
- Despite acknowledging the fact that structuralism is a theory of composite objects, Renz fails to see that since simples are not composites by their very definition, the question of structuralism does not even arise in their discussion.[34]

Hence, Renz's attempt to reject the "form is structure" conception using the example of mereological simples seems futile.

8. This is the conclusion of Renz's argument and because of its deeply troublesome nature it must be completely rejected. As discussed, "form is structure" is a conception that is possible only in cases of hylomorphic compounds. In fact, Renz himself accepts that while form is structure in the case of composite material objects, the same cannot be said in the case of mereological simples. Now it has already been shown that since it is best to understand mereological simples as "non-hylomorphic" compounds, such entities simply fall beyond the scope of the present discussion and consequently, they do not serve as a counter example to structuralism.

Moving on to the second part of the critical analysis of Renz's account, following are three of the major inconsistencies that can be identified in his discussion.

Firstly, Renz's assumption that mereological simples are hylomorphic compounds seems counter-intuitive for how can a simple be a compound? Moreover, even if Renz's assertions interpreted as emphasizing only "mereological simplicity" and not "metaphysical simplicity", significant issues arise, some of which have already been discussed in the previous passages. Additionally, here one may also argue that the moment "metaphysical composition" (viz. the view that matter and form compose an object) is brought into the picture, the discussion becomes mereological in nature. This is because the notion of composition fundamentally rests on the corresponding notion of parthood. In other words, to be composed is to be composed of parts. Consequently, to say that discussions of metaphysical composition do not have a mereological

underpinning to them seems difficult to accept. As a result, like Koslicki one must either deny complexity of all kinds to mereological simples or one must admit that even metaphysical complexity leads to mereological complexity.

Secondly, as mentioned before, Renz in his discussion of mereological simples presents three possible ways of characterising these entities namely, the Pointy view, the MaxCon view and the Indivisibility view. In fact, after a brief elucidation of each of these views, Renz explicitly endorses the Indivisibility view of simples. However, despite making such a claim, he goes on to contradict this view. In other words, while this view particularly holds that simples are "metaphysically indivisible" (and thus, metaphysically simple), Renz ascribes mereological simples, metaphysical complexity by asserting that they are composites of matter and form. Evidently then, there seems to be great inconsistency in the way Renz conceptualises mereological simples.

Finally, in his entire discussion, Renz seeks to arrive at the ontological status of form in a hylomorphic compound by referring to its functionality. However, later he goes on to show how there is ontologically more to form than just its role as structure, particularly with reference to entities such as mereological simples. But certain issues can be identified with such an approach. Firstly, Renz's attempt to understand "what form is" with reference to "what it does"(in hylomorphic compounds) may be considered reductive and inadequate by some thinkers.In other words, while it may not be wrong to assume that the essence of form is closely tied up with the functions it performs, one may reject the claim that the former is merely limited to the latter. On the other hand, as mentioned before, even if such a conceptualisation of form is accepted, one may still argue that the "form is structure" view is admissible as the most plausible description of form at least in the case of all hylomorphic compounds.This is because in all hylomorphic compounds (including mereological simples), form can be understood as performing the role of structure.

Thus, taking into considerationall the philosophical troubles posited above, one may assert that Renz's account fails to offer any substantial reasons for the rejectionof the "form is structure" conception.

3. Advocating the "Form is Structure" view

In the previous section of this paper, several shortcomings of Renz's account have been elucidated primarily to establish why his argument against the "form is structure" conception fails to hold. In the course of this discussion, the major point of contention is his construal of mereological simples as matter-form compounds. Contrarily, in this paper it is Koslicki's conception of mereological simples as metaphysically simple entities that has been advocated. Herein it has been emphasized that unlike Renz, Koslicki ties together a metaphysical and mereological analysis of material objects. In other words,Koslicki does not merely adopt the Aristotelian view that objects arematter-

form compounds[35] but she goes on to assert that this matter and form are proper parts of the object(at least on one principle of division).In fact, owing to this sort of an analysis of ordinary material objects, her account has been labelled as that of "mereological hylomorphism". Very briefly, thisanalysis of ordinary material objects[36] consists of the following assertions.

- Koslicki begins by asserting that for a material object to come into existence it must be constituted of some matter. This is because nothing can be created ex nihilo (viz. out of nothing).
- But only matter cannot bring about an object into existence. For instance, a mere pile of wooden planks does not bring a table into existence. For a table to be created, something more is needed in addition to the wooden planks that is, the planks must be arranged in a certain manner (viz. it must have the structure/form of a table).
- As a result, since an object is not brought into existence only from some matter, the matter cannot be identical to the constituted object (viz. whole). In fact, a constituted object and its constituting matter can be seen to be vastly distinct in certain respects (such as their sortal properties, modal properties, temporal propertiesand so on).[37] Furthermore, since these objects are qualitatively distinct, using Leibniz's principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals[38], Koslicki infers that they are numerically distinct entities. Nonetheless, Koslicki asserts that the constituting matteris best understood as a part of the constituted object because of three reasons.[39] It is Karen Bennett who makes this potituted object can be understood; and lastly, the many similarities between the constituting matter and the constituted object become understandable. Thus, according to Koslicki, at least when objects are understood with respect to how they are composed metaphysically they can be divided into parts such as material parts (and formal parts). But sincethe constituting matter (viz. material parts)isnot identical to the constituted object, the matter is only a "proper part" of the object (viz. it is a part of the whole but is not identical to the whole).
- Furthermore,Koslicki introduces the mereological principle of Weak Supplementation into the discussion which particularly holds that no whole/ object can have just one proper part (that is, the whole must have another proper part that is disjoint from the former proper part). Now it is using this principle of mereological supplementation that Koslicki advocates the view that an object in addition to its constituting matter has some other proper part. Moreover, since this additional proper part must be disjoint from the material proper part of the object, she infers that the best candidate for this is "form". This is because according to the theory of hylomorphism, not only are objects composites of matter and form but thesecomponents are also ontologically

distinct and separate. Additionally, she asserts that it is form that makes some object the kind of thing it is by dictating the number, type and configuration of the object's material parts.

- In short then, according to Koslicki, every object is a composite of certain material proper parts and formal proper parts.

As a result, Koslicki's mereological analysis of ordinary material objects is derived from a hylomorphic construal of such objects. Now this is exactly the kind of conceptualisation of objects that is endorsed in this paper in opposition to Renz's account. This is because intuitively, it cannot be denied that at least on one principle of division, the matter that constitutes an object can be considered to be a part of it.Furthermore, to assume that objects have only one kind of part (be it spatial parts, material parts, functional parts, temporal parts and so on) is a very limited take on how the notion of parthood is instantiated in the world around us. In other words, each whole in the world can be divided in distinct ways and subsequently, it can be ascribed different kinds of parts. So,for instance, the same clay statue can be said to have spatial parts, material parts, functional parts and temporal parts etc. but on distinct principles of division. In fact, even Koslicki's claim is not that matter and form are the only kind of parts that a composite object can have but that when an object is understood as a hylomorphic compound, the matter and form of the object are "proper parts" of it. Hence, unlike Renz, Koslicki seems to be right in asserting that the metaphysical compositeness of hylomorphic compounds leads to their mereological complexity.

Furthermore, as mentioned before, Koslicki (like Aristotle) conceives of mereological simples/atoms as being metaphysically simple entities. Now, there seem to be two major reasons for this kind of a claim. Firstly, Koslicki (like Aristotle) posits form as the unifying principle of ordinary material objects which she understands as "structured wholes. Additionally, as mentioned before, Koslicki asserts that the role of form is to dictate the number, type and even the configuration of the material parts of an object. So, for instance, a water molecule cannot be composed of a carbon atom and two hydrogen atoms. Instead, it is the form of a water molecule that dictates that for any molecule to be a water molecule, it should firstly be composed of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom and secondly, these atoms must be unified in a particular way of chemical bonding. In short then, form is described as that which makes something the kind of object it is by unifying/structuring the matter of the object. Furthermore, Koslicki (like Aristotle) argues that since form is the unifying principle of mereologically complex entities (such as ordinary material objects), it itself must be mereologically simple. This is because if form too was mereologically complex, then there would have to be some other entity that unified its parts. Simply stated, if form is what unifies the different parts of a whole and form itself is understood as a whole composed of parts, then there must be something that unifies the latter's parts. Now if form is the unifying principle of

mereologically complex objects, the unifying principle of form itself would be another form which would further be composed of some parts that are unified by still another form and so on. Thus, in order to avoid this sort of an infinite regress in determining the unifying principle of mereologically complex entities, Koslicki claims that it is best to construe "form" as being mereologically simple. Now Koslicki's conceptualisation of mereological simples seems to be right in at least two respects. Firstly, following the theory of hylomorphism, it cannot be denied that it is form that unifies and structures objects and makes them the sort of entities that they are. Secondly, a whole comes into existence only when its parts are unified. As a result, if form was also understood as having parts, in order for it to be 'one' and not many it would have to be unified. However, as pointed out by Koslicki (and Aristotle), explaining the unification of form only complicates the issue furtherand thus, it seems best to hold that form though unifies mereologically complex entities, it itself is mereologically simple.

In addition to this, the second motivation that seems to lie behind Koslicki's view that mereological simples are metaphysically simple is that such a claim does not conflict with her other assertions. In lucid terms, such a claim allows one to hold that metaphysical complexity of objects leads to mereological complexity without exception. As a result, while simples can be said to be both metaphysically and mereologically simple, composites can be said to be mereologically complex because of their metaphysical complexity. In fact, here it may be briefly pointed out that Koslicki describes even the constituting matter of objects as being metaphysically complex (viz. as being composed of some matter and form of its own). As a result, even the constituting matter of an object is said to have some lower level of matter and form as its proper parts. For instance, even the lump of clay that constitutes a statue can be understood as having clay particles and the form of "lump-ness" as its material and formal proper parts respectively. Hence, for Koslicki, all hylomorphic compounds are mereologically complex entities and so, by denying mereological simples, metaphysical complexity, she intends to offer an account of mereological hylomorphism that holds without fail.

Thus, it is by referring to particularly this account of mereological hylomorphism that the following assertions have been made in this paper.

- Mereological simples are also metaphysically simple viz. they are not matter-form composites. This is because all entities that are metaphysically complex (viz. hylomorphic compounds) are also mereologically complex.
- Since simples are not hylomorphic compounds, they fail to be a counter example to structuralism which means that Renz's argument fails to show why hylomorphism is not reducible to structuralism.
- However, it is argued that even if simples are understood as matter-form compounds, it cannot be denied that form does structure the "matter" of such compounds which is enough reason to believe that "form is structure" in the case of all hylomorphic compounds.

- As a result, the argument here is that firstly, mereological simples are not hylomorphic compounds and secondly, in the case of all hylomorphic compounds, form is structure. Thus, hylomorphism is in fact, reducible to structuralism.

Conclusion

In this paper, it is argued that Renz's attempt to posit mereological simples as a counter example to structuralism is unjustified. This sort of a counter-argument to Renz has been established primarily by rejecting some of the key premises of his argument, along with identifying certain general inconsistencies in his account. Particularly in this context, it is argued that Renz's conceptualisation of simples as hylomorphic compounds is inherently problematic. In fact, following Koslicki's line of thought, it is asserted that mereological simples are best construed as metaphysically simple entities. Additionally, herein it is claimed that even if mereological simples are understood as matter-form compounds, there seems to be no reason to deny that form structures the matter of such compounds and thus, the "form is structure" conception can still be admitted in such cases. Thus, in this paper, it is asserted that the role of form is played by structure in all hylomorphic compounds (viz. composite objects) and thus, hylomorphism is reducible to structuralism.

Notes

[1] A standard hylomorphic analysis of concrete, physical objects holds that such objects are best construed as compounds of matter and form.

[2] Simply stated, material constitution is a relation between a constituted entity and its constituent. For instance, a statue and the piece of clay that makes it up are said to exist in the relation of constitution. However, here it may also be pointed out that the relation of constitution is applicable to several other kinds of entities such as propositions, state of affairs, groups, events etc. But when the scope of discussion of this relation is restricted primarily to material objects, it is termed as "material constitution".

[3] This discussion has taken the form of a full-fledged debate in metaphysics between what is called the "Constitution is Identity" view and the "Constitution is not Identity" view. The former holds that a constituted object and its constituting object are identical and hence, the relation of constitution is a relation of identity. On the other hand, the latter view holds that the constituted object and its constituting object are not identical and therefore, the constitution relation is not an identity relation. For a detailed discussion on these two views, see Noonan (1993), Burke (1994), Wasserman (2002), Wallace (2011a and 2011b), Baker (1997), Thomson (1998), Koslicki (2008).

[4] The fundamental issue in instances of material constitution is that where there exists a constituted object there also exists the matter that constitutes it. In such a case then, is the matter identical to the object it constitutes or are they distinct entities? Accepting either of these claims leads to further complications. For instance, if the constituting and constituted

objects are distinct then there are two objects coinciding both materially and spatio-temporally viz. they share the exact same matter and also exist at the same place at the same time. This is known as the "problem of coinciding objects". Furthermore, if such objects are distinct then what grounds their similarities such as physical properties, chemical composition, location etc? On the other hand, if the objects are identical then what grounds the many differences between them such as differences in their modal properties, sortal properties, temporal properties, persistence conditions etc? This is known as the "grounding problem" for it demands that all the similarities and differences between the constitutionally related objects be grounded. Till date, no one response to these problems has been sufficient to clearly establish the constitution relation. In fact it is here that contemporary thinkers like Kathrin Koslicki have come into the picture. For instance, Koslicki (2004, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2018) is an advocate of the "Constitution is not Identity" view and she supports this thesis by offering a mereological and hylomorphic analysis of material objects. Simply put, she asserts that material objects are not just compounds of matter and form but the matter and form are proper parts of the object. Consequently, Koslicki sets out to show how constitutionally related objects differ in their formal proper parts and hence, are non-identical.

[5] For a detailed discussion of their views, see Fine (1999, 2003 and 2008), Johnston (1992) and Koslicki (2004, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2018).

[6] Aristotle, "Physics," in The Complete Works of Aristotle: the Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

[7] Briefly stated, Parmenides rejected all change and asserted that there was only being and no becoming. For a detailed discussion on this, see Aristotle (1995, Book I, 191a25-191a34, p. 453).

[8] For instance, a leaf changing its color is an instance of accidental change, whereas a plant sprouting from a seed can be understood as a case of substantial change.

[9] Renz (2018, p. 22)

[10] Here it must be pointed out that Koslicki (2018) rejects what Sidelle (2014) calls a "non-robust reading of hylomorphism" viz. form is just the arrangement of parts. However, it must be noted that Koslicki's rejection of this view rests on the fact that this conceptualization of form fails to resolve the grounding problem. Now intuitively, it may seem like the account presented in this paper conflicts with that of Koslicki's. However, this is not the case. In the present discussion, nowhere is it argued that the ontological status of form must be restricted to that of structure or that this conception of form resolves the grounding problem. The primary claim in this paper is that form "structures" all hylomorphic compounds, as a result of which the theories of hylomorphism and structuralism can be said to be intimately connected and this assertion seems to fall in line with Koslicki's views.

[11] Graham Renz, "Form as structure: It 's not so simple," Ratio XXXI 1 March 2018, p. 20-36.

[12] For instance, some object qualifies as being a clay statue only when it is ascribed a particular form, namely "statue-hood". Unless, the piece of clay instantiates this specific form, it fails to be a statue.

[13] For contemporary thinkers, this relation of "in virtue of" is the relation of grounding. Hence, according to structuralism, an object's kind, powers and capacities can be said to be grounded in its structure.

[14] Renz explicitly points out that this sort of a claim rests on an understanding of what form is with reference to what it does.

[15] For a detailed discussion on these views, see Koslicki (2008), Jaworski (2014), Fine (1999) and Rea (2011).

[16] Evidently, this assertion supports the argument presented in this paper. This is because the "form is structure" conception in composite objects is unproblematic even for Renz and so, once it has been established that composite objects are the only hylomorphic compounds that exist, it can be inferred that the "form is structure" conception is acceptable in the case of all hylomorphic compounds.

[17] P is a proper part of some whole W, if P is a part of W and P is not identical to W.

[18] According to this view, mereological simples are un-extended and non-voluminous point particles.

[19] According to this view, simples are "maximally continuous objects". Renz (2018, p. 25-26) defines "maximally continuous" as "occupying the largest matter filled, continuous regions of space".

[20] In this context, Renz posits several other responses to his account including that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, an early Aristotelian commentator and Koslicki. For instance, Koslicki (Renz, 2018, p. 29) argues that structuralism is essentially a theory involving a whole and its parts. Since, simples are not mereologically complex they do not fall within the purview of structuralism. Thus, mereological simples pose no challenge to structuralism. Here it must be pointed out that although the same conclusion is being arrived at in this paper, the approach is different that is, while Koslicki's response takes into consideration the mereological simplicity of these entities, the proposed account focuses on their metaphysical simplicity.

[21] Here Renz (2018, p. 27) points out that on this conception of simples, one may assume that since such entities are material and extended, they are infinitely divisible. In other words, since matter is infinitely divisible, the natural bodies that it composes (viz. the simples) are also infinitely divisible. However, Renz argues that this is not the case. Here he seems to distinguish between divisibility in thought and divisibility in reality. Thus, according to him, while simples are conceptually infinitely divisible, in reality they are not infinitely divisible.

[22] According to Renz, simples are metaphysically complex for they are understood as being compounds of two metaphysical principles namely, matter and form.

[23] Renz (2018, p. 27, footnote 11)

[24] Here Renz (2018, p. 28) adds that "exist" may be understood as also referring to the possibility and conceivability of such entities.

[25] Koslicki (2004) attempts to respond to the grounding problem by offering a non-exhaustive list of all the properties that constitutionally related objects may or may not share. Among these, she categorizes intrinsic (such as weight, shape, color, texture) and relational properties (such as location) as those that are without a doubt always shared by the objects in question. Moreover, this similarity in intrinsic and relational properties is grounded in the fact that they share the exact same matter. Thus, for Koslicki certain properties are "constitutionally derived" (viz. the properties that the constituted object has in virtue of being in a constitution relation with another object) while others are "non-constitutionally derived" (viz. the properties that the constituted object has in virtue of possessing a certain form).

[26] For instance, a statue has its weight, color, texture, location, chemical composition etc in virtue of being composed of some matter such as clay. Contrarily, a statue belongs to the

sort "statue", or has the modal property of being able to survive a loss of its parts, or possesses the property of being beautiful etc in virtue of having a certain form (viz. statue-hood).

[27] Here it may be pointed out that this is not a rejection of Renz's premise but only an attempt to offer an alternative way of understanding an object's various powers and capacities.

[28] Here it may be pointed out that the aim of this paper is not to describe the ontological status of form in hylomorphic compounds but just to show that if the principle of form is understood with respect to what it does, then form is structure in the case of all hylomorphic compounds.

[29] Here one may also infer that Renz seems to be an anti-realist primarily with respect to the notion of mereological simples and form/structure. Simply put, realism refers to the view that the physical world as it exists is independent of us and how we know about it. On the contrary, anti-realism is the view that the way the world is, is largely connected to how we view and understand it. Moreover, scientific anti-realism in particular holds that the aim of science is merely to describe the observable parts of the world. As a result,anti-realists assert that since a true description of the unobservable parts of our physical reality cannot be offered, the existence of entities constituting this part of the reality can always be doubted. Furthermore, here by the "observable parts" of the world, anti-realists intend to refer to entities such as trees, animals, tables and chairs etc. On the other hand, ordinarily entities such as atoms, electrons, quarks etc are said to comprise the "non-observable" part of the physical world at least in the general sense of the term. Now here it may be pointed out that since Renz is primarily focused on "non-observable" entities such as mereological simples/atoms and explicitly considers the possibility of not only rejecting the existence of such entities but also of conceptualizing them in distinct ways (such as the Pointy View, MaxCon view etc.), Renz seems to endorse the view that what mereological simples are, is in some way dependent on how we construe them and thus, he can be labeled as an anti-realist in that sense. Similarly, Renz also acknowledges the possibility of understanding "structure" and "form" in distinct ways. For instance, his entire argument rests on the rejection of the proposal that what form is, can be understood merely with reference to its functionality. As a result, Renz's account can be interpreted as an anti-realist take on mereological simples and structuralism.

[30] This account has been elaborated upon in the following section of this paper.

[31] For instance, spatial parts cannot be proper parts of an object because such parts can be ascribed even to simples. For example, even an electron can be said to have a right half and a left half. Thus, if matter and form are not the proper parts ofcomposite objects, then what proper parts do they have?

[32] This is in direct contrast to Aristotle's conception of mereological atom/simple. Both Koslicki (2008) and Aristotle hold that mereological atoms are all form and no matter. In fact it is because they lack matter, that such entities are said to be both mereologically and metaphysically indivisible. On the contrary, in Renz's account, a mereological simple is construed as being material, extended and even metaphysically complex and yet it is conceived of as being only conceptually divisible.

[33] Here it may be pointed out that in the ongoing discussion it isenough to posit mereological simples asmerely non-hylomorphic entities to show why Renz's argument cannot be accepted. Nonetheless, Koslicki's conception of simples has been elaborated upon in the following section of this paper.

[34] This assertion seems to be in line with Koslicki's response to Renz's argument which has been posited previously.

[35] Here it may be noted that in her discussion of material objects, Koslicki (2008) even refers to Aristotle's mereological views which she believes to be scattered through the course of his many works but are most pertinent in his "Metaphysics" particularly in the book "Philosophical Lexicon".

[36] Koslicki (2008)

[37] For instance, take the case of the piece of wood and the table it constitutes. The objects differ in their sortal properties because while the former belongs to the sort "piece of wood", the latter belongs to the sort "table". They differ in their modal properties because while the piece of wood can survive being broken down, the table cannot. The objects differ in their temporal properties because the piece of wood exists before the table comes into existence and can continue to exist even after the table has been destroyed.

[38] Simply stated, this principle of identity holds that if two objects are numerically identical, then they have the exact same properties.

[39] It is Karen Bennett who makes this point in her work "Koslicki on Formal Proper Parts" (2011). Herein she points out that the primary reason why Koslickiseems to endorsethe view that the constituting matter is a (proper) part of the constituted object is because the latter believes that such a view is the best way to explain three major phenomena that occur in all instances of material constitution viz. the constituting object continues to exist after the constituted object is brought into existence; the objects are materially and spatio-temporally coincident entities; and the objects have some of the exact same properties such as physical properties, chemical properties etc.

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A Debate on the Prerequisites of Nyāya

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Abstract:

The three categories, namely, doubt, purpose and example are regarded as prerequisites *(purvānga)* of *Nyāya*. In this paper I will attempt to explain the nature of the prerequisites of *Nyāya*. After that *Nāgārjuna's* objections against the prerequisites of *Nyāya* will be presented in accordance with *Vaidalya-sūtras* (VS). I will try to illustrate *Nāgārjuna's* objections in such a way as to make them more plausible. Finally, I will suggest what *Nyāya* philosophers could have replied to these objections. The purpose of this paper is to create a deeper understanding of the prerequisites of *Nyāya* in the light of *Nāgārjuna's* objections.

Keywords: *Contradictory, Viśeṣāpekṣā*, *Origination, Similarity and Content*

Introduction

Nāgārjuna has devoted an entire book, namely *Vaidalya-sūtra* (VS), to refute the sixteen categories of *Nyāya*. Why did *Nāgārjuna* put such effort to refute the *Nyāya* categories? More generally, the question is this: why is the *Nyāya-Mādhyamika* debate important? We will try to answer this general question before entering into particular issues. We know that *Nāgārjuna's* central philosophical stance is counted as *śūnya-vāda.* The term '*śūnya'* is translated into English as 'empty'. The pivotal claim of *śūnya-vāda* is that everything is empty. To say that an entity is empty is to say that the entity is not describable. There are four broad possible ways in which something can be described. We can describe it as real, or as unreal, or as both real and unreal, or as

neither real nor unreal. In *mūl-mādhyamika-kārikā Nāgārjuna* has shown that given any entity whatsoever it is not describable in any of the four ways. And there is no possible fifth way, so everything has to be indescribable. Now the aim of *Nyāya* philosophy is twofold. Firstly, it aims to sketch a theoretical description of the entities whose knowledge leads to liberation. Secondly, it attempts to provide a general method of theoretical investigation. Thus, the sixteen categories are developed to construct a method by which we can attain a theoretical knowledge about any subject matter. It is a truism that the specialists of medicine, grammar, literature, politics etc. use the techniques of *Nyāya* in order to render a theoretical description of their subjects. This is the reason why *Nyāya* is considered as the lamp-light of all studies. Opposed to the *Nyāya* view, *Nāgārjuna* holds that everything is indescribable. But it is not practically possible to refute every description; therefore, *Nāgārjuna* devotes a book to refute the general method of description. This general method is constructed in *Nyāya-sūtra*; hence *Nāgārjuna* attacks every category depicted there. In this short paper we will confine ourselves to *Nāgārjuna's* objections against the prerequisites of *Nyāya* and will attempt to say something in reply to those objections. It might be noted that if refutation of the prerequisites of *Nyāya* is tenable, then it leaves no room for a discussion about the further categories. The categories that are concerned with presenting *Nyāya* and defending it are to be established after the prerequisites of *Nyāya* gets established. This is why I have chosen to discuss the dispute over the prerequisites of *Nyāya.*

Doubt, purpose and example are counted as prerequisites of *Nyāya*. *Nyāya* may be understood as a complex sentence which is used to convey an inference. However, it does not make much sense to convey an inference to a listener who is not suitable. There are three criteria that makes a listener suitable. These three criteria are prerequisites of *Nyāya.* First, it is required that the listener should have a doubt about the fact which the inference is designed to establish. Second, the listener should also have a desire to know the fact, which the inference is proving. There is a distinction between the first and the second criterion, because doubting a thing is not necessarily connected with desiring to know the thing. A person may have doubt about many things, but it does not imply that he desires to know everything he doubts. People desire to know only those facts which could serve some purposes. Therefore, doubt and a sense of purpose in the listener are regarded as two separate prerequisites for expressing an inference to him. It may be noted that here knowledge is counted as purely extrinsically valuable. For in *Nyāya* philosophy only pleasure and absence of pain are considered as intrinsically valuable. Thus, it is assumed that desire for knowledge arises because knowledge serves some further purposes. But, do not we seek knowledge, at least about some issues, for their own sake? Is not it the case that knowledge about some topics bears intrinsic value for some people? If it is the case, then one can desire to understand an inference which may not serve any further purpose. Accordingly, an objection can be put forward that a sense of purpose is not necessary for becoming a suitable listener. It might be replied as follows: even a wise man knows many things only partially, so he can have doubts about unknown parts of those things. Even if we agree that knowledge is intrinsically valuable, it is a truism that a person may have stronger desire to know one thing than

other things. To explain this difference in degrees of desire, we could say that some doubts cause more pain than others. A doubt that brings more pain is the one that we desire intensely to remove. And a doubt that brings very little pain is left as it is. Thus, the ultimate drive becomes removal of pain. We can know this through introspection that doubt is a source of pain; and in order to get rid of pain, we desire knowledge. Third, an inference attempts to establish a fact that is still uncertain on the basis of some other facts that are already certain. To put it differently, an inference establishes an unknown fact on the basis of some known facts. Now the listener can understand an inference only if the facts which are basis of that inference are known to him. Therefore, the awareness of the relevant facts from the part of the listener is also regarded as a prerequisite of expressing a *Nyāya*-v*ākya* to him. The fact which is basis of an inference is called 'example' in the language of *Nyāya* philosophy.

The prerequisites of *Nyāya,* namely, doubt, purpose and example are respectively the third, fourth and fifth categories of the sixteen *Nyāya* categories. In this paper we will examine the three categories one by one in the light of *Nāgārjuna's* objections.

Doubt (Saṁśaya):

Nāgārjuna advances an objection against the category of *saṁśaya* (doubt). He devotes only three *sūtras* to express his stand with regard to doubt. He does not attack the five types of doubt individually, instead he provides a general argument to show the impossibility of doubt as such. Before examining the argument, we will explain the definition of doubt. There are two different ways to define doubt. It may be defined by specifying its causes, or it may be defined in terms of its content. Here we will provide a definition of doubt in terms of its content following *Tarkasaṁgraha*.

Doubt is defined as follows: "doubt is a cognition of diverse contradictory properties in a one single entity". It is to be noted that any cognition of diverse contradictory properties is not doubt, because *'Samūhālambanajñāna'* has as its content diverse contradictory properties, yet it is not doubt. *Samūhālambanajñāna* could involve, for instance, cognition of a pot and a clothe in one act of perception; as a result, that one piece of cognition has as its content two independent entities or two *mukhya-viśeṣya*. This cognition has diverse contradictory properties, i.e, clothe-ness and pot-ness, yet it is obvious that this is not a doubt. Thus, in order to avoid over-coverage in *samūhālambanajñāna,* the expression 'in a one entity' *(eka-viśeṣyaka)* has to be inserted in the definition of doubt.

If the term 'diverse' is omitted from the definition, then the definition will apply to examples like 'a pot has pot-ness which is contradictory to clotheness'. This cognition is not doubt, but has as its content one entity pot as *viśeṣya* and one complex property *(prakāra)* which has 'contradiction' as its constituent part. Thus, the term 'diverse' (as a qualifier to property) needs to be inserted in the definition to avoid such over-coverage.

If the term 'contradictory' is removed from the definition of doubt then the definition will apply to '*samuccayajñāna'* which is not doubt. The term contradictory, in the present usage, refers to two entities which cannot exist in the same locus at the same time, but exists in different locus at the same time. For instance, man-ness and stump-ness are two contradictory properties as they cannot reside in the same locus simultaneously, but exist in man and pot respectively. However, doubt is such a cognitive state that it presents two contradictory properties in the same locus. A s*amuccaya* cognition is like 'the hill has both fire and absence of fire'. Fire is on the one part of the hill and absence of fire is on another part of the hill. Therefore, the cognition is not a doubt cognition; though it has one *viśeṣya* and many *prakāra*. But the *prakāra-s* are not contradictory to one another. Therefore, in order to avoid over-coverage in s*amuccayajñāna,* the term 'contradictory' is to be inserted. The contradictory properties, which are ascribed to one entity, is known as *'koti'* of a doubt. We may translate the term *'koti'* into English as component. The content of a doubt, for example is like this: 'is this a man or a stump?'. The two components in this doubt are 'man-ness' and 'stump-ness', which are '*bhāva-padārtha'* or positive entities. But, some *Nyāya* philosophers believe that one component of doubt should be '*bhāva-padārtha'* and the other one should be *'abhāva-padārtha'*. According to them the form of the above doubt should be like this: 'whether this is a man or not?' And there could be a second doubt as to 'whether this is a stump or not?'. I feel that the second approach is more preferable, for it clearly exhibits the contradiction between the two components.

Nāgārjuna argues that there is an inherent contradiction in the *Nyāya* category of doubt. What *Nāgārjuna* states in twenty first *Vaidalya-sūtra* (VS-21) may be translated as follows: 'no doubt arises regarding what is cognized and what is not cognized, because what is cognized does exist and what is not cognized does not exist.' To explain, *Nyāya* thinkers hold that the object which is cognized by *pramāṇa* does exist. That which is cognized is known as existent, so its existence cannot be doubted. If a property of that thing is cognized then the property is also known to be existent. Therefore, doubt regarding that property cannot also arise. On the other hand, an entity that is not cognized is counted as non-existent. The property of an entity which is not cognized is also counted as non-existent. Therefore, a doubt like 'whether this is a man or not?' cannot arise. If it is apprehended as a man, then it is established to be a man. On contrary, if there is non-apprehension of a man then the absence of a man is established. Either there is apprehension of a man, or non-apprehension of a man; there is no third alternative. Therefore, it is either proved as a man, or else it is proved as a non-man; so, the doubt that whether it is a man or not cannot arise.

In order to make his argument stronger, *Nāgārjuna* puts forward a possible reply that is expressed in VS-22 which may be translated as follows: "Doubt exists because there is an absence of *viśeṣāpekṣā,* that is, cognition of a distinguishing feature." (This

is not an exact translation of VS-22; there is a difficulty in translating this *sūtra.* We will discuss this difficulty later.) To explain, the reply is that doubt is possible because one can have doubt about that entity whose distinguishing feature is not known. We must add that this not knowing does not imply non-existence. An entity which is not known could be held as non-existent only under certain conditions. The conditions are as follows: i) if all the conditions of perception of an entity is present, but still it is not perceived, then the absence of that entity is cognized. ii) such a perception should be aided by a *tarka* like this: 'had there been a pot on the ground, I would have seen it'. However, returning to the above example distance and lack of light are impediments to perception, so the conditions for apprehending absence are not fulfilled. Therefore, non-apprehending it as a man does not imply that it is not a man. Therefore, the doubt that 'Is it a man or not?' about that distant entity can arise. In sum, if mere non-apprehension of an entity does not confirm its non-existence, a doubt about it can arise.

In response, *Nāgārjuna* states that even if we concede that mere non-apprehension of an entity does not confirm its absence, still the possibility of doubt cannot be established. This he expresses in VS-23 which may be translated as follows: "there is no doubt that depends on distinguishing features, because of previous negation". Here *Nāgārjuna* is arguing that although the absence of a distinguishing property is not cognized, the existence of that property is also not cognized. The distinguishing property does not become an object of cognition, so doubt about it cannot arise. The crucial point is this: since the distinguishing property cannot come into one's cognitive state, doubt about it cannot arise.

The reading of VS-22 creates a difficulty which may be noted here. VS-22 is *'astyevasaṁśayo viśeṣānapekṣāt'*.VS-22 asserts that doubt must exist, because of the absence of *viśeṣāpekṣā.* But, *Nyāya-sūtra* (1/1/22) claims that *viśeṣāpekṣā* is a necessary condition for doubt. Furthermore, VS-23 asserts that doubt does not exist as the existence of *viśeṣāpekṣā* has been previously refuted. Thus, from *Nyāya-sūtra* and VS-23 we know that *viśeṣāpekṣā* is required for doubt. However, VS-22 flatly states that there is doubt because there is absence of *viśeṣāpekṣā.* Therefore, VS-22 should not be trusted as it is found. The notes of *Acharya Shempa Doorjee* on the *sūtra* suggests the same. The *sūtra,* therefore, must be understood with some alteration. I think there are two different ways in which the alteration can be made: (i) anticipating the opponent's objection that *viśeṣāpekṣā* produces doubt, *Nāgārjuna* writes '*nāstyevasa ṁśayoviśeṣānapekṣāt*'. Here I have put '*nāsti'* instead of *'asti'*. Accordingly, the *sūtra* means that since there is no *viśeṣāpekṣā* , doubt does not arise. In the next *sutra* VS-23 *Nāgārjuna* says that there is no *viśeṣāpekṣâ* because it has already been refuted. We may also alter the *sutra* as follows: (ii) *'astyevasaṁśayoviśeṣapekṣāt'*. Here I have replaced the term '*ānapekṣāt* ' by '*apekṣāt*'. Thereby, the *sūtra* means that doubt exists because of *viśeṣāpekṣā.* Changing a term of a *sūtra* in order to explain it is indeed a limitation. But, without changing a term of VS-22, it seems impossible to make sense of it.

We may sum up the refutation of doubt as follows: A person either knows an entity, or he does not know; there is no third alternative. Now if one knows an entity, one cannot have doubt about it. On contrary, if one does not know an entity, then one cannot also have doubt regarding it. For, there is nothing in his cognitive state regarding that entity, so he cannot have doubt about it. It may be held that when one knows a thing only partially, then doubt regarding its unknown part could arise. However, such a contention confronts similar problem. Doubt cannot arise about the part one already knows, nor can doubt arise regarding the part which remains unknown. Therefore, *Nāgārjuna* holds that since doubt requires both cognition and non-cognition of the same part or thing, doubt involves an inherent contradiction. This argument appears very plausible.

I think that a reply to this objection is embedded in the causal analysis of doubt as it has been presented in *Nyāya-sūtra* tradition. I would like to present that reply along these lines: though one cannot doubt what one perceives, a doubt can arise about the unperceived parts or properties of the perceived entity. For, the perceived entity could give rise to memory of its unperceived possible parts which were seen as associated with it in the past. There is a rule that when one relatum is perceived, it generates a memory of the other relatum. For example, when a mahout, who is not accompanied by an elephant, is perceived, it may give rise to the memory of an elephant. Likewise, the partial perception of an entity may give rise to memory of unperceived possible parts or properties of it which are seen as associated with it in the past. And if the possible properties are contradictory to one another, that is, they cannot all reside simultaneously in the perceived entity, then doubt arises. For example, when a doubt arises as to 'Is this a man or a stump?', the doubter by observing certain height and breadth, recollects man-ness and stump-ness. For, both man-ness and stump-ness were seen as associated with such height and breadth in the past. Thus, the doubt has as its content two or more unperceived contradictory properties, which come into memory, and an entity as substratum, which is perceived. The person having doubt does not know which one of the recollected properties is there in the percieved entity. Now *Nāgārjuna's* objection can be easily replied. The objection was that the person who knows about certain properties cannot have doubt about them. This objection does not arise because the person apprehends the properties through memory and does not know them to exist in the partially perceived entity. The other objection was that what is entirely unknown, that is, not there in one's cognitive state cannot become the content of one's doubt. This objection does not arise as well. For, the properties are not entirely non-apprehended as they come into one's mental state through memory. This has been made clear in the *Nyāya* analysis of the term *viśeṣāpekṣâ,* which constitutes two claims. First, the distinguishing features of the object of doubt should not come into *anubhava*. Second, the distinguishing features should come into memory.

Purpose (Prayojana):

Prayojana is the fourth one among the sixteen *Nyāya* categories. In *Nyāya-sūtra*(1/1/24) *Prayojana* is defined as follows: "Prayojanais an *artha* that becomes the object of volition". In other words, purpose is that '*artha*' which becomes the object of volition. Volition, which is a property of the soul, leads to action. Actions produced out of volition are of three types mental, verbal and physical. Again, the term *'artha'* primarily refers to *sukha* (pleasure) or absence of *duḥkha*(pain). And secondarily, the term refers to anything that is understood as a means to s*ukha* or absence of *duḥkha*. *Sukha* and absence of *duḥkha* are counted as primary purposes, because mere cognition of them gives rise to desire to attain them. This desire then yields volition towards them. Finally, volition produces action. Mere cognition of an entity other than *sukha* or absence of *duḥkha* cannot in themselves give rise to volition. When such an entity is understood as leading to *sukha* or absence of *duḥkha*, volition arises to attain it. Similarly, when something is known as leading to *duḥkha* or absence of *sukha*, there arises a volition to avoid it. Thus, it must be clear that only *sukha* and absence of *duḥkha* are intrinsically valuable. Now it might to be objected that the cognition of *sukha* etc. cannot not lead to volition. For, pleasure etc. are properties of *ātman.* But all our volitions have as their content some external object. Thus, the causes of pleasure etc. are to be regarded as *artha* for which one can have volition. So, by the term *artha* we must understand the entities which lead to pleasure etc. and not pleasure etc. in themselves. Thus, purpose is not *sukha* or absence of *duḥkha,* but it is something which is apprehended as leading to *sukha* etc.

Nāgārjuna argues that the category of purpose cannot stand the test of logic. He devotes only one *sutra* (VS-24) to show that purpose is impossible. The *sūtra* might be translated as follows: "Purpose cannot be established, because it is existent or non-existent." To explain, before its origination purpose is to be either existent or non-existent; however, given any of the alternative, it cannot be originated. It is to be kept in mind that a purpose has to be an effect in itself. For example, a potter initiates to make a pot; accordingly, the pot becomes his purpose. What *Nāgārjuna* wants to show is that origination of an effect is impossible. His argument is that the effect has to either exist or not exist before its origination. In both the cases, origination of the effect is impossible. Let us first consider why an effect cannot exist before its origination. We take a pot as an example of effect. The pot cannot exist in its material cause (mud) before its origination. Had the pot existed in the mud (before its origination), any action to produce the pot would have become unintelligible. For, no one can produce what already exists. It might be objected that action is required for uncovering the effect which hides in its material cause. Mustard oil remains covered by the mustard: when that covering is removed, oil gets manifested. This manifestation is counted as origination. Likewise, a pot hides inside the mud and action is required for its manifestation. But here the objection is that even though we allow this argument, there arises a fallacious infinite regress. To explain, manifestation is an effect

in itself: thus, according to the opponent, manifestation should be existent before its origination. In that case, action would be required for manifesting the manifestation. That second manifestation is an effect in itself, so it is also required to be manifested, so on to infinity.

On the other hand, if the effect is held as non-existent before its origination, it will be impossible to produce the effect as well. An effect must have some relation to its cause; otherwise, anything would produce anything. One precondition of any relation is that the entities getting related should exist at the same time. However, if effect is non-existent before its origination, then the effect cannot have any relation to its cause before its origination. Likewise, before its origination the effect does not have any relation to the entities other than its cause. Therefore, the effect is as much unrelated to its cause as it is to its non-cause. When the effect comes into being, it could come into being from anything. Thus, anything can produce anything. This conclusion is obviously false, so we must conclude that the claim 'effect is non-existent before its origination' is also mistaken.

In response, the *Nyāya* philosophers say that origination of a non-existent effect is possible, so purpose is possible. A reply to the above objection is given along these lines: a non-existent effect of a particular genre can come into being from a particular genre of cause, because a relationship between a non-existent effect and an existent cause is possible. But, what is the evidence for accepting such a paradoxical relation? To prove that such a relation is possible *Nyāya* philosophers have cited another example where we could find a relationship between existent and non-existent entities. The example is as follows: I have a right cognition about the fact that someday I will die. My death does not exist at present, but the right cognition of my death exists at present. The cognition of my death should have a relation with its object, that is, my future death. If there were no relation between a piece of cognition and its object, then every piece cognition would have everything as its object which is certainly not the case. Now my death is non-existent, but the cognition of my death is existent. Therefore, a relation between existent cognition and its non-existent object has to be admitted. Similarity, an existent cause can have a relation with a non-existent effect. Thus, the objection should not arise that anything can be produced from anything.

Nāgārjuna's project was to balance two opposite positions, namely *satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda* and reject both. There are many arguments, which we have not considered for brevity, from both sides which balances each other. However, in my view the above argument from *Nyāya* school has no counter-argument, thus probably it puts an end to the debate.

In VS-25 *Nāgārjuna* anticipates an objection against the refutation of *prayojana* as follows: whether or not pot per-exists in mud, the potter acts on mud in order to produce the pot. His work on mud to produce the pot is such a fact that can be proved

by thousands of examples. Therefore, the existence of purpose, which is pot in the present context, cannot be denied. Here *Nāgārjuna* points out that such a reply is unwarranted, because nothing can be proved by examples. For, the category of example is itself impossible.

Example (Dristanta):

Nāgārjuna devotes six *sutras* to show why example is impossible. Let us first consider the definition of example. In the *Nyāya-sūtra*(1/1/25) example *(dṛiṣtānta)* is defined as follows: "example is that object about which both examiner *(parīkṣaka)* and ordinary people *(laukika)* agree". An examiner is one who has the ability to arrive at the right conclusion by employing *pramāṇa* and *tarka*. Ordinary people are they who does not have such abilities. The term *'driṣta'* means a thing which is perceived through sense organs. But, here in the term *'dṛiṣtānta'* the extended meaning (*lakṣyārtha)* of the term *'driṣta'* is to be taken. The extended meaning of the term *'driṣta'* covers objects known through all *pramāṇas*. The term *'anta'* means certainty, so *dṛiṣtānta* means an object about which both examiner and ordinary people are certain. However, it may be objected that there is no such object about which every ordinary man and examiner do agree. For instance, *Nyāya* philosophers frequently use *ākāsha* as a *dṛiṣtānta* but *ākāsha*, which is the substratum of sound, is not admitted by ordinary people. Thus, according to *Varadrāja* the purport of the *sutra*(1/1/25) is that any object which is admitted by both the proponent *(vâdi)* and the opponent *(prati-vādi)* is *dṛiṣtānta*. It is noteworthy that in any debate *dṛiṣtānta* plays a crucial role. Both defense and refutation of any view is supported by *dṛiṣtānta*. Moreover, the *vyāpti* relation, which is *karaṇa* of inference, is confirmed with the help of *dṛiṣtānta*. Accordingly, *dṛiṣtānta* is being classified into two types, namely, *anvya dṛiṣtānta* and *vyātireka dṛiṣtānta*. However, a question may arise about counting *dṛiṣtānta* as a separate category. The question is as follows: what is the difference between *udāharna* and *dṛiṣtānta*? For, both serves the same purpose in an inference. It is to be answered that there are subtle differences between *udāharna* and *dṛiṣtānta*. First, *udāharṇa* is a sentence while *dṛiṣtānta* is a *sthal* or situation. Secondly, *udāharṇa* is employed only in case of *parārthānumāna*, but *dṛiṣtānta* is applied in both *svārtha* and *parārthānumāna*.

In VS-26 *Nāgārjuna* states that similar to the category of purpose category of example is also impossible. He offers an argument in VS-27 which may be translated as follows: "since there is no beginning and middle, there is no end that is seen". *Nāgārjuna* interprets *dṛiṣtānta* as 'the end that is seen'. And he argues that we can make sense of end of something only when there is a beginning and middle. However, the *Nyāya* philosophers do not mention what the 'beginning' and the 'middle' are. Therefore, the 'end' makes no sense. Here it must be noted that for *Nyāya* philosophers the term 'end'that is, *'anta'* means certainty. If 'end' is certainty, then what will be the 'beginning'

and 'middle'? The 'beginning' and the 'middle' should be such that the 'end', which is certainty, has to be dependent on them in some sense. *Nāgārjuna* objects that there is nothing that can serve as 'beginning' and 'middle'; thus, the 'end' becomes unintelligible.

In reply to this objection, I will try to supplement the meaning of the terms 'beginning' and 'middle' from *Nyāya* perspective in the following way: usually when we know a thing, we know it through some of its general properties and some of its particular properties. General property is its being something, that is, its being the reference of the term 'this' *(idanta)*, or its having the properties like *prameyatva, padārthatva* etc. Again, particular property consists of its having distinguishing feature and specific properties. For instance, particular properties of a pot are pot-ness, impermanence etc. Now by 'beginning' we may understand knowing something through its general properties. For example, one could know a pot as a reference of the term 'this', that is, as a substratum of '*idanta*'. The term 'middle' might mean a doubt regarding its particular properties. A doubt about its particular property is like this: 'is this a pot or not?'. And the term 'end' means certainty which arises after removal of the doubt. Thus, the 'end' consists of knowing the entity through both particular and general properties.

Nāgārjuna has argued that since 'beginning' and 'middle' are not possible, 'end' is also not possible. It follows that neither knowing an entity through its general properties is possible, nor doubt about its particular properties is possible; therefore, the 'end', that is, certain cognition of it as having both particular and general properties is not possible. For, knowing general properties require *pramāṇa*, but *Nāgārjuna* has refuted *pramāṇa*. At the beginning of VS *Nāgārjuna* refutes *pramāṇa* and *prameya.*He has also refuted doubt, so he claims that doubt about particular properties is not possible as well. Thus, from *Mādhyamika* point of view it is justified to claim that 'beginning' and 'middle' are not possible. Thereby, the 'end' is also not possible. One might put forward an objection against the above interpretation of the term 'middle' as 'doubt regarding particular properties' as follows: *Nāgārjuna* states that 'beginning' and 'middle' are necessary for the 'end'. But the 'end', which is certainty, is not always attained after doubt. We may arrive at certainty without being in doubt. Thus the 'middle', by which I mean doubt, becomes such that it does not remain necessary for the end. It may be replied that VS-27 is to be understood as follows: a beginning is necessary for an end, but the middle is not necessary. There may or may not be a middle. For *Nāgārjuna* states that "since there is no beginning and middle, there is no end that is seen." in VS-27. This does not imply that the middle is necessary for the end.

Nāgārjuna advances another objection against *driṣtānta*. He refutes the claim that on the basis of *driṣtānta,* an inference can be made. Assume that we want to prove a property S *(sādhya)* in a locus P (*pakṣa*). In order to prove this, we cite a *driṣtānta* D.

D becomes *driṣtānta* by virtue of the fact that it has the property S and it is similar to P. We may reformulate the situation as follows:

i. We want to prove that P has the property S.
ii. D is similar to P.
iii. D has the property S.

Therefore, P must also have the property S.

Now *Nāgārjuna* attacks the premise two. According to *Nāgārjuna* D is similar to P may mean four things.

I. D is absolutely similar to P.
II. D is absolutely dissimilar to P.
III. D is slightly similar to P.
IV. D is largely similar to P.

Nāgārjuna rejects I by saying that *agni* (fire) cannot be example of *teja*(heat) in VS-28. That is to say, if one attempts to prove some property in *teja*, then he cannot cite *agni* as an example. This is because *agni* is absolutely similar or identical to *teja*. Thus, what is not yet proved of *teja* is not also proved of *agni*. In VS-29 *Nāgārjuna* rejects II by saying that water cannot be an example of fire since they are contradictory. The point is that if D is contradictory to P, then there would be no guarantee on P's having a property on the ground that D has it. In VS-30 *Nāgārjuna* rejects III by saying that a piece of hair cannot be an example of a mountain. In VS-31 *Nāgārjuna* states that for same reasons the alternative IV is to be rejected as well.

I think that here *Nāgārjuna's* objection is twofold. First, it is not clear how much similarity is required for something to become a *driṣtānta*. There is no definite point up-to which similarity is being demanded. Second, an entity may have any possible degree of similarity, but it cannot be counted as an example. Thus, nothing can be ascertained as a *driṣtānta*.

The *Nyāya* philosophers might reply that a definite point of similarity is required for something to become an example. P and D should be similar in the point that both should have the property called *hetu*. It does not matter whether P and D are similar or dissimilar from other respects. For instance, when we infer fire on a hill, we may take the kitchen as *driṣtānta*. The kitchen becomes *driṣtānta* due to the fact that it has the *hetu* smoke which is also there on the *pakṣa* hill. The inference requires that the hill and the kitchen must be similar to the point that both should have *hetu* smoke.

Conclusion

The paper does not intend to show why doubt, purpose and example are regarded as prerequisites of *Nyâya*, so that question has not been addressed in detail. The main purpose of the paper was to explain *Nâgârjuna's* objections and find some replies to

them. Though all *sūtras* regarding refutation of the prerequisites of *Nyāya* has been explained, the interpretation of the *sutra* VS-22 on the refutation of doubt has a limitation. The limitation is that I have suggested a replacement of a term of the *sūtra* in order to provide a coherent explanation of it. Replacing a term of a *sūtra* with another term seems unacceptable, because such a replacement makes it a new *sūtra.* Thus, on my view, the interpretation of VS-22 is incomplete. On the other hand, the replies from the *Nyāya* side are brief but substantial. The replies have made the following important points regarding doubt, purpose and example respectively:

(1) The emergence of doubt about an object has three preconditions: (a) the general properties of the object are to be known through *anubhava* with certainty. (b) The possible distinguishing properties of the object are to be cognized through memory. (c) The distinguishing properties of the object must not be known through *anubhava*.

(2) In connection with purpose, it has been pointed out that a relation between an existent and a non-existent entity is possible.

(3) In relation to example, we have noted that the *pakṣa* and *driṣtānta* must be similar to the point that they both should possess the *hetu*.

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Mereology:- Unity and Phenomenal Consciousness: Some Objections and Possible Responses

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Abstract:

Consciousness abounds with objects and relations. Amidst these relations and objects, consciousness remains unified. In order to provide a viable account of this unified consciousness, Tim Bayne distinguishes phenomenal unity relation from some other relations of unity that are found within consciousness, such as representational unity, subject unity and others. He presents a mereological account of the phenomenal unity. Mereological account of phenomenal unity is very much unique and exclusive; yet, some objections have been raised against mereological account of phenomenal unity which will appear as a big challenge to the unity thesis. In this article, I will try to give responses to all such objections and thereby provide plausible defenses for the mereological account.

Keywords: *Conjoint experience, 'homeomerous' mereological account, phenomenology, subsumption, synchronic unity.*

Introduction:

Consciousness abounds with objects and relations. Amidst these relations and objects, consciousness remains unified. In order to provide a viable account of this unified consciousness, Tim Bayne distinguishes phenomenal unity relation from some other relations of unity that are found within consciousness, such as representational

unity, subject unity and others. He presents a mereological account of the phenomenal unity. Before discussing this account, we shall briefly restate his characterization of phenomenal consciousness and phenomenal unity.

Following T. Nagel, he says that phenomenal consciousness is a sort of consciousness that 'a creature enjoys when there is something it is like for that creature to be the creature that it is'.[1]This kind of consciousness alone is accompanied by an experiential perspective or point of view. I cannot deny that there is something that it is like for me to be me. Similarly, there is something it is like for you to be you. For Bayne, Consciousness is phenomenal consciousness and the terms 'conscious', 'experiential', 'phenomenal' are synonymous. Specific conscious states are distinguished from each other by virtue of their phenomenal character or content. What it is like to hear a bird singing is different from what it is like to smell the fragrance of a rose. Each of these experiences has a distinctive feel. Thus, a state is said to possess phenomenal character when there is something it is like to enjoy that state.[2]

A stream of consciousness is a segment of experience that is unified both at a time and over time; that is to say, they are unified synchronically and diachronically. Bayne notes that the stream metaphor aptly captures the flowing aspect of consciousness and it is employed in the account of the unity of consciousness through time. Since Bayne's focus is on the unity of consciousness at a time, he chooses the field metaphor in order to capture the structure of consciousness at a time. Bayne points out that the notions of subject unity and representational unity fail to reach at the heart of the unity of consciousness. He invites us to reflect on 'what it is like to hear a rumba playing on a stereo whilst a bartender mixes a mojito'. Obviously these two experiences are subject unified as they are had by the same subject. They can also be viewed as representationally unified when one hears the rumba coming from behind the bartender. Bayne maintains that such characterizations do not capture the deeper and the primitive unity involving the fact that these two experiences possess a *conjoint experiential character*. In order to capture this depth of phenomenal unity, Bayne wants us to begin with the description of one's overall state of consciousness. He points out that any description of such a state that omits the fact that those experiences are had as parts or components of a single, total (overall) conscious state is incomplete. He calls this sort of unity as phenomenal unity, which is sometimes termed as co-consciousness. Here is Bayne describing phenomenal unity,

'We can say that what it is for a pair of experiences to occur within a single phenomenal field *just* is for them to enjoy a conjoint phenomenality – for there to be something it is like for the subject in question not only to have both experiences but to have them together'.[3]

Bayne thinks that such a conception of the unity of consciousness can explain why it is possible to hold 'that the simultaneous experiences of a single subject are necessarily unified'.

II

The mereological account:

Before discussing Bayne's mereological account of the unity of consciousness few words regarding the distinction between 'top-down' and 'bottom-up'accounts of synchronic unity are in order. Dainton's[4] approach to the unity of consciousness can be characterized as 'bottom-up' approach where he constructs fully unified stream of consciousness out of particular experiences and relation of co-consciousness. On the other hand, top-down accounts claim subject's 'overall' experience as primitive and want to give account of the unity of consciousness by explaining the relationship between the 'overall' experience and the parts of that experience or component experiences that compose the overall experience. Bayne is a 'top-down' theorist. He considers the 'conjoint experiential character' or (subsumption of component experiences by the overall experience) as primitive, where two or more experiences are had at a time by a subject. In others words, hetries to explain how the experience of conjunction is related to these 'conjunction of experiences'. By way of explanation, he employs the notion of subsumption and suggests that 'overall' experiences subsume the experiences that compose the former. Two or more experiences of a subject at a time are subsumed by the single 'overall' experience. The 'bottom-up'approach to the unity of consciousness, on the other hands, treats phenomenal unity as primitive. However, Bayne's account of the unity of consciousness espouses top-down approach since it starts with the multiplicity of consciousness and treats subsumption as primitive. This account begins with 'the unity that subsumes this multiplicity.'[5]

Bayne explains this notion of subsumption in terms of parts and wholes, i. e., in mereological terms. When one experience subsumes another experience, we can say that the former contains the latter. A subject's total experiential state is a whole that includes other experiential parts. These experiential parts may be subject's overall perceptual experiences, her overall auditory experiences as well as the experience of a car parking in front of her house. These total phenomenal states are characterized as 'homoamorous. In a sense, experiential parts are 'like – parted'. In other words, all the parts that compose the total state share their experiential nature. Bayne notes that even thinkers who account for the unity of consciousness in terms of co-consciousness often do so in mereological language. By way of example, he presents Lockwood saying that experiences are co-consciousness when they are parts of a complex experience'.[6]

According to the mereological account, phenomenal unity is the relation between token experiences. Token experiences such as my backache and my visual experiences of a galloping horse are parts of a single composite experience, and, so, phenomenally

unified with each other. However, my experience of a galloping horse and another person's experience of the same are not phenomenally unified because there is no experience which can be said to contain both these experiences. This view is known as experiential parts view.

One motivating reason for the mereological account of phenomenal unity is, Bayne says, its natural fit with the tripartite conception of experience. Thus, a range of distinct phenomenal properties get involved in an experience produced by tasting an orange. These properties are 'sweetness', 'tanginess', and 'orangeness'. Each of these phenomenal properties get associated with distinct experiences that are parts of the more complex experience of tasting the orange. Again, this experience will be a part of more complex experiences. Complex experiences of the last part may be modality specific or it may involve contributions from multiple modalities, such as experience associated with one's total perceptual phenomenology. Bayne writes: 'indeed, one's overall phenomenal field – what it is like to be you right now – is, in my view, a very complex phenomenal event that contains within it the rest of one's experiential states.'[7] In order to clarify the tripartite conception, Bayne points out that whatever involves experiences as part is not itself an experience. For, the so-called stream of consciousness is not a phenomenal event because no single phenomenal property is to be found corresponding to this stream of consciousness. We do not deny that some sort of 'what it's likeness' is associated with this typical stream of consciousness but that is spread out and also distributed throughout number of distinct conscious states. It does not possess the sort of unity that the phenomenal field possess. For Bayne, only that stream of consciousness can be called a phenomenal event which endures during a single specious present. In response to the objection that the ordinary ways of counting experiences clash with the tripartite conception, Bayne wants to restrict the latter to the individuation of maximally specific or fine-grained phenomenal properties.

Thus, while experiencing several objects and regions of space as blue, at a single point of time, the phenomenal property of blue occurring in a specific region of space is maximally specific and as determinates, do not have determinates. Once restricted to fine-grained maximally determinate, phenomenal properties the tripartite conception will be able to account for multiple experiences of blue at a single point in time and will not clash with the common-sense approach to individuation of experience.

III

It is obviously true that Bayne's mereological account of phenomenal unity is very much unique and exclusive; yet, some possible objections might be raised against mereological account of phenomenal unity which will appear as a big challenge to the unity thesis. These objections are as follows:

First: It is said against Bayne's mereological view that the mereological view of the unity of phenomenal consciousness is neither primitivist view nor substantive because it provides oneness or singularity of total experience as ground of mereological account of phenomenal unity. Farid Masrour, one of the leading thinkers in contemporary era, raises such objection against mereological account. According to him, mereological view mainly provides an account about one-ness of total experience. He opines that mereological account of phenomenal unity is similar with 'Newtonian space model' to which the most fundamental fact that relations of co-spatiality between various points (or regions) of a space is the fact that these points (or regions) are parts of the same single space. Masrour claims that it is possible to provide an alternative account of mereological model through which the phenomenal unity of consciousness may be explained clearly and plausibly without the help of unity thesis of Tim Bayne. This alternative account is called as 'connectivity view' or 'unity of chain view'. This can also be identified as 'Leibnizian view'. Briefly, Farid Masrour maintains that in Leibnizian views of space, the oneness of space emerges from certain conditions over spatial relations. Similarly, according to connectivity view, unity relations are grounded in the existence of unity paths and facts about membership in the unity path. This view is 'Leibnizian' in the sense that it accounts for unity relations in terms of local relations such as spatial or causal relations between experiences. He defines the notion of 'unity path' in the following way: 'There is a unity path between two experiences *Em* and *En* if and only if *Em* is bound with *En* or there is an *Er* such that *Em* is bound with *Er* and there is a unity path from *Er* to *Em*.'[8] He maintains that every path consists in a chain of binder experiences and such experiences are bound by the path. An experience is treated as a member of a unity path in the following ways: 'An experience is a member of a path if and only if it is one of the binders in the path or one of the experiences that are bound by the binders in the path.'[9] The property of a set of experiences can be explained by the notions of unity path and path membership. Masrour identifies such property of a set of experiences as 'minimal connectivity.' He also defined the notion of 'minimal connectivity' in the following manner: 'A set of experiences, S, is minimally connected if and only if there is a unity path, P, such that all members of S are members of P.'[10] Again, a set of experiences is unified in virtue if it is minimally connected. So Masrour claims that the connectivity view is primitivist and substantive because it builds unity in phenomenal consciousness from the grounds up.

In response to this objection, we can say that Bayne's mereological approach to the unity of consciousness were primarily designed to explain the notion of phenomenal unity rather than 'some independent relation that might function as its metaphysical basis'.[11] There is no doubt that Bayne's mereological account of phenomenal unity might be directed to one kind of metaphysical structure but for that reason it cannot be said that his account is fully metaphysical. It may be that Farid Masrour tries to understand Bayne's view that contention 'a pair of experiences to occurs within a single phenomenal

field *just* in for them to enjoy phenomenality' in light of the Newtonian model (of spatial structure). Masrour then provides an alternative metaphysical structure in order to explain the unity of consciousness. However, Bayne points out that no metaphysical structures, be it Newtonian or other, need be invoked for the classification of the phenomenology of the unity of consciousness. Bayne also makes it clear that his mereological account is not metaphysically motivated. Hence there is no requirement of any alternative metaphysical account like the connectivity view provided by Farid Masrour. Indeed, in the beginning of mereological account, Bayne emphasizes that the discussion of the nature of phenomenal consciousness does not espouse any metaphysical view. He thinks that the words 'conscious', 'experiential', 'phenomenal' are synonyms. He maintains that specific conscious states, are different from each other depending on their phenomenal character or content. Bayne's main intention is to build a phenomenological account of phenomenal unity. So Masrour's objection against Bayne's mereological account is not plausible.

Moreover, when Masrour remarks that some binder experiences make a unity path through chain and experiences are bound by the unity path then it is questionable in which label of consciousness make such chain and who the maker is. We think that the phenomenology of phenomenal unity plays an important role. Again, we think that there is no new information in the notion of 'path membership' mentioned by Masrour because Bayne explains his notion of unity of experience by the concept of subsumption.' So Masrour's objection against mereological account of phenomenal unity has lost its contextual appropriateness.

The second objection raised against Bayne's mereological account of phenomenal unity is that the mereological account of phenomenal unity provides an account only of synchronic unity or unity –at-a-time but this account fails to capture the pinpoint of diachronic unity or unity over time. Masrour, himself claims that he will be able to provide a uniform unity account that can highlight both on synchronic unity and diachronic unity.

In response to this objection, we think that either he is not aware about the aim of Bayne's mereological account of phenomenal unity or he raises such objection consciously which is not important for this account. Bayne clearly mentions that a stream of consciousness is a segment of experience which is unified at-a-time and over-time or synchronically and diachronically but stream metaphor aptly captured the aspect of consciousness through time. He maintains that field metaphor captured the structure of consciousness at-a-time. For this, Bayne emphasizes on the synchronic unity of phenomenal consciousness. He also points out that the notions of subject's unity and representational unity failed to reach at the heart of the unity of phenomenal consciousness. So, such unity does not capture the deeper and the primitive unity involving the fact that these two experiences possess a conjoint experiential character.

Again, Bayne does not deny the existence of diachronic unity; rather he thinks that we might discuss the nature of diachronic unity in different aspects. Hence the mereological account of phenomenal unity thesis is unique and plausible for its purpose.

Moreover, Bayne's unity thesis relating to phenomenal consciousness can easily explain the temporal structure of consciousness. In other words, full unity of phenomenal consciousness will be revealed into instantaneous snapshots of any subjects' experiences. He holds that ''we can take a slice' of the stream of consciousness for our study though consciousness is temporally extended.'[12] He also identifies two aspects of the structure of temporal consciousness – firstly, conscious events are located in objective time and secondly, conscious events also represent events as occurring at particular time. The first aspect is identified as temporal structure of vehicles of consciousness, second aspect is identified as the content of consciousness. So, it is more plausible to explain the time slice of the unity thesis in terms of the temporal structure of the vehicles of consciousness rather than the temporal structure of its content.

Thirdly, another objection against mereological account of phenomenal unity raised by Masrour, is that Bayne's unity thesis is purely structural or logical matter. That is to say, phenomenology relating such unity is one kind of bare phenomenology.[13]In briefly, according to Bayne and Chalmers, the feeling of pain and the seeing of the book is being unified with each-other make a difference between subject's overall phenomenology. In their views, having two experiences in a conjoint manner does not make any substantial contribution to the phenomenology or content. Unity is fully structural or logical matter and the phenomenology related with is bare phenomenology. For this, Farid Masrour critics it as bare unity views. Mereological view of phenomenal unity provided by Bayne is bare where bare unities are one kind of connections between experiences that can occur independently of any experience of a specific relation.

Masrour presents an alternative account. He claims that this alternative account is more acceptable and flawless. According to him, phenomenal unity between experiences makes a substantial contribution to subject's overall phenomenology and content. For example, when one can claim that one has experiences of the singing of the birds and the feeling of elation which are bound with each other, then there is some gap in description of concerned phenomenology. They can give an informative answer when those two experiences are described as bound in so far as the experience of the singing of the birds are taken as the cause of her elation. Similar things can be said when experiences are connected but not bound. For example, when one can claim that one has experiences of the seeing of a bird and the feeling of its presence which are not bound with each other, then there is some gap in description of concerned phenomenology. In such a case, the unity path connects the experiences and this unity path makes a substantial contribution.

In response to this objection, we can say that it is not clear what the term 'bare' signifies in 'bare phenomenology'. Some possible literally meaning of the word 'bare' that can be apparently discerned are 'lacking the content', 'naked', and 'commonplace' etc. Now, if Farid Masrour accepts Bayne's unity thesis in the first sense, 'lacking the content' sense of 'bare' – it is not acceptable because if we re-visit Bayne's unity thesis, we will see that subjects have two experiences –e_1, e_2 simultaneously and, at the same time, subsumed by total experience. In this case, the act of subsumption is neither conceptual, nor metaphysical, they are true by nature. In other words, subjects have a phenomenology of e_1 experience, phenomenology of e_2 experience and conjoint phenomenology of unified experiences of e_1 and e_2 subsumed by e_3. So, the first sense of the term 'bare' is not acceptable.

Again, if we think that he accepts the word 'bare' in the sense 'naked' and identifies it as bare phenomenology, it is not plausible also. Bayne's unity thesis is not void. The foundation of his mereological accounts of phenomenal unity is tripartite conception of experience. He opines that a range of distinct phenomenal properties get involved in an experience produced by tasting an orange. The properties are 'sweetness', 'tanginess', and 'orangeness'. Each of these phenomenal properties get associated with distinct experiences that are parts of the more complex experience of tasting the orange. Again, this experience will be a part of more complex experiences. Complex experiences of the last sort may be modality specific or it may involve contributions from multiple modalities, such as experience associated with one's total perceptual phenomenology. So, it is not correct to say that Bayne's unity thesis is 'bare' in this sense.

Again, if he considers Bayne's unity thesis as bare in the sense of 'commonplace' – this also is not fully acceptable; we have seen that he introduces many terms like 'subsumption', 'phenomenal field', 'maximally fine grained', 'overall', 'modality specific', etc. to account his unity thesis of phenomenal unity. This presentation makes his unity thesis as unique and extra-ordinary.

Moreover, if Masrour intends to object that there is no new insight of pure phenomenology or descriptive phenomenology in the mereological account of Bayne's unity thesis, then we might point out that it is not a flaw of Bayne's mereological account. It seems that the main aim of Bayne's unity thesis is to build an account of unity of phenomenal consciousness. In such cases, by introducing the notion of 'phenomenal field', 'what it is like' etc., Bayne highlights such phenomenology which is fruitful for his account. Bayne's purpose was not to explore the pure phenomenology or descriptive phenomenology for this unity thesis.

So, we think that there is no valid ground for identifying Bayne's unity thesis as 'bare unity thesis and characterizing the phenomenology related with the unity thesis as 'bare phenomenology'.

Fourth, David. J. Bennett and C.S. Hill raise an objection against Bayne's mereological account of phenomenal unity. According to them, the unity relation introduced by Bayne is one unity-making-relations.[14]Bayne thinks that experiences are unified in being subsumed within an overarching experience. Subsumption holds to serve as a single, unity making and universal relations. However, Bennett and Hill claim that consciousness possess many unities making relations. Some of them join fairly wide swaths of the experiences of a subject at a time; some of them join more narrow swaths of experiences. Unity relations are positively pluralist. They also claim that such unity making relations belongs to different mental levels.

We think that it is an important and more plausible objection against mereological account of Bayne's phenomenal unity of consciousness. It is obviously true that we enjoy various kinds of unity relations in our consciousness, viz, objectual unity, subject unity, access unity, phenomenal unity etc. Bayne himself is aware about the fact that it is possible to have various kinds of unity relations within our consciousness. Rather, the primary aim of his unity thesis is to find and illustrate the nature of phenomenal unity in phenomenal consciousness. He maintains that subject unity and representational unity fail to reach at the heart of the unity of consciousness. He proposes to explore the conjoint experiential character in order to provide a deeper and primitive unity thesis. Even when we enjoy 'what it is like' experience, encompassing our 'overall' phenomenal field, such unity originates by subsuming multiplicity of consciousness. The unity of experiences in the form of 'what it is like' of overall phenomenal field of subject's consciousness comes as only 'one' – not two or more. So, Bennett and Hill may provide a unique account by mentioning many unity making relations but Bayne's theory has not lost its importance.

Fifth: According to Bayne, subsumption relation is one kind of species of part-whole relations where some experiences are the part of subsuming experiences. Against this view, D. J. Bennett and C.S. Hill claim that experiences are joined by one or more of our many unity making relations into consciousness but they do not bear a part-whole relation to some larger experiential whole.[15]It is true that some of our experiences appear to us as part-whole relations with each other. However, they claim that we cannot find any phenomenon of our experiences which is unified through introspection. They also object that they are unexpectedly instructed by Tim Bayne to discern the presence of universal distinct relations through introspection.[16]

In response to this objection, we can say that this objection is not strong enough to counter against Bayne's mereological account of phenomenal unity because the primitive of Bayne's mereological account is the notion of subsumption. He explains the notion of subsumption with the help of the relation between parts and wholes. When one experience subsumes another experience, we can say that the former contains the latter. A subject's total experiential state is a whole that includes other experiential

parts. These experiential parts may be subject's overall perceptual experiences. These total phenomenal states are characterized as 'homeomerous'. In a sense, experiential parts are 'like-parted'. In other words, all the parts that compose the total state share their experiential nature. Now if we assume that the notion of parts-whole relations may be applicable but not so in all cases, then the target of the notion of subsumption fails to reach their goal. Obviously, the primitive foundation of mereological account will be weak which is not acceptable to Bayne. Again, it might not be possible to capture the phenomenal field of consciousness fully without the help of introspection. The opponents might raise question about the viability of introspection. However, Bayne claims that we are aware of the contents of those states only via introspection. The plausibility of this claim is much stronger. Bayne points out that the viability of introspection can be shown if we take 'conscious states' to include thoughts. This becomes apparent when we note that there surely is an introspectable difference between consciously judging that it is cloudy and consciously hoping that it is cloudy. Bayne argues that if it is possible for introspection to distinguishes thoughts that differ only on the basis of the moods or attitudes associated with those thought then we must admit that introspection has access to more than the contents of thoughts we can introspectively distinguish between visual experiences having the same content easily. So, it would be plausible if we consider Bayne's claim as *simple a claim* rather than an instruction as object by D. J. Bennettand C.S. Hill.[17]

Sixth: In their mereological account T. Bayne and D. Chalmers point out that not every collection of experiences constitutes a unified experiential whole but only those that enjoy a 'conjoint phenomenology'. By the phrase 'conjoint phenomenology' he wants to say that 'two experiences have conjoint phenomenology' if and only if 'there is something that it is like for the subject in question to have both experiences together.' The opponent asked about 'what is involved in a subject having both experiences together.'[18] Two possible accounts may be given – one of which claims that 'a pair of experiences has a conjoint phenomenology if, and, only if, they are connected by the primitive relationship of experienced togetherness.'[19]Another accountholds that 'a subject S has a pair of experiences together if S has both experiences *simultaneous*, with no further condition or constraint. B. Dainton thinks that though the mereological account is offering nothing new and distinctive, yet, the first alternative is more viable rather than the other. In this sense, conjoint phenomenology of a unified conscious state is one whose constituent experiences are all mutually co-conscious. Van Gulik raises a similar but an important question about the notion of 'conjoint phenomenology'. As he mentions, it requires more than the mere conjunction of phenomenal states, for being had by the same subject at one and the same time does not entail that e_1 and $e_2$will be phenomenally unified with each other. He asks whether the phenomenal unity between $e_1$and$e_2$require having an experience of the conjunction of $e_1$ande_2. He also notes that this requirement might seem to be too strong, for it is not likely to be convinced for all

possible crosswise conjunctive pairing among all at one's many experiences at-a-time. So Van Gulick concludes, it is unclear just what conjunctive phenomenal character could be 'given that it must be something more than just having the *conjunction* of what – *it-is-likeness, but weaker than having the what-it-is-likeness associated with an experience of conjunction*.'[20] So, it is not clear what actually is meant by the term 'conjoint phenomenology.'

We, following Tim Bayne, don't regard this phrase as unproblematic. Indeed, it may be that it is one of the most troublesome phrases in the philosophical discussion. Tim Bayne captures the notion of 'conjoint phenomenology' by appeal to the notion of 'what it's likeness.' In his words, 'experiences are phenomenally unified with each other exactly when they exemplify conjoint what-it's likeness'.[21]For example, happiness and a thought are phenomenally unified with each other if it will enjoy the phenomenal character associated with the happiness and with the thought. By contrast, phenomenal togetherness will be absent, if the happiness occurs in one stream of consciousness and the thought in another. The main feature of conjoint phenomenality described by T. Bayne, involve within a 'single phenomenal field'. This unique feature does not involve in Dainton's account where he characterized 'conjoint phenomenology' as 'they are connected by the primitive relationship of experienced togetherness."[22] So, there is no doubt that Bayne's notion of 'conjoint phenomenology' is new one. Again, in response to Van Gulick, we think, this objection is an important challenge to Bayne's notion of phenomenal unity. It is one kind of dilemma that has two horns. First horn of this dilemma concerned with the conjunction of phenomenal states and second horn is concerned with identifying 'phenomenal togetherness' with an experience of conjunction. Bayne replies this objection by three complicated ways:

i): it is not clear what experiential content amounts to. Most representationalists assume that all our experiences have a mind-to-world direction of fit. Some others hold that some types of experiences have world-to-mind direction of fit. Though he supports the later views, yet, he opines that it is a point that complicates matters: what it would be to have an experience whose content is fixed by conjoining the contents of a world – to-mind state with that of the contents of a mind – to-world state. ii) Second is that the plausibility of the conjunctive analysis depends on what kind of cognitive constraints govern consciousness. For example: one has an experience with content <p>. S/he believes that he/she has an experience with the content <p>. In such case, the conjunctive analysis would be implausible if one has an experience of <q> and an experience of <r> and then two experiences are phenomenally unified with each other, but he/she does not believe that he/she has an experience <q&r> for its complexity. iii) Final complicated factor involves one's attitude to the conjunctive analysis and conception of the degree to which consciousness is unified. Like Bayne, we also think that we find certain kind of difficulty to provide a settled view of the conjunctive analysis. We also

observe that there is no alternative account of conjoint phenomenality. We suggest that there is need for more research work on the unity of consciousness.

Seven**:** Bayne claims that phenomenal unity relation is a universal unity relation. He points out that two experiences are phenomenally unified when there is a single experience that subsumed all of them. C.S. Hill asks whether this unity connect all of the conscious experiences of a subject or 'some' of them. He also expresses his doubt about the universality of phenomenal unity relation. Again, he asks what the operative notion of an experience here is, in what sense of 'experience' it is said that experiences are generally subsumed by more encompassing experiences.[23]

In response to this worry of C.S. Hill, we might say, following Bayne that all of our conscious experiences connect together as a conjoint manner. My visual experience of red rose, auditory experience of a bird's singing on a tree and my olfactory experience of a smell are had together as co-subsumed, they are connected as components, elements or parts of a single encompassing conscious state. The opponent might object that some cases of behavioral and psychological dissociative cases like split brain syndrome, hypnosis, minimally responsive patient's consciousness may appear as parted but Bayne shows us that we find a fundamental unifying feature through introspection. It is pretty clear that phenomenal unity possesses universal character for its mereological character, its phenomenality, its subsuming feature, its accessibility and introspectable as single unity relation. In reply to Hill's worry about the nature of 'experience', we might say that Bayne employs the tripartite conception of experience. According to this conception, individuation of experiences should be viewed in terms of subjects of experience, times and phenomenal properties or events. A range of distinct phenomenal properties get involved in an experience produced by tasting an orange. These properties are 'sweetness', 'tanginess', and 'orangeness'. Each of these phenomenal properties gets associated with distinct experiences that are parts of the more complex experience of tasting the orange. Again, this experience will be a part of more complex experiences. Complex experiences of the last part may be modality specific. Bayne wants to restrict the tripartite conception of experience to the individuation of maximally specific or fine-grained phenomenal properties.

Eight: R. Van Gulick, one of the commentators, raises a question against Bayne's notion of phenomenal unity and his account of the self. He discusses whether Bayne is able to build an adequate definition of phenomenal unity. He also asks whether phenomenal unity, as characterized by Bayne, is really different from representational unity. He notes that Bayne characterizes phenomenal unity in several ways from which we can mention at least three specifications. These are as follows:

i) They are subsumed by a single conscious state, i.e., by being parts or components of that single state, ii) they occur within a single phenomenal field and iii) They possess

a conjoint experiential character.[24] Though Bayne claims that these three features will captures the real nature of phenomenal unity but actual situation is very different. On feature of these three is not supposed to be the cause of the other. It is not pretty clear that these features individually or collectively reveal the requisite sense of phenomenal unity. Again, Bayne distinguishes his concept of phenomenal unity from representational unity. R.V.Gulick claims that Bayne's notion of phenomenal unity is essentially related with representational unity. He argues that virtual conception of the self necessarily entails that phenomenal unity is 'essentially representational'.Gulick suggests, 'Phenomenal unity might be a special type or sub-domain of representational unity, perhaps a minimal unity of coherent content needed to construct the viewpoint of an experiential self.'[25] So Gulick asks why Bayne believes phenomenal unity is not essentially connected with representational.

We think that in a sense Gulick is right on both counts. We have already highlighted Gulick's notion of conjoint phenomenality just in the previous point. However, here we point out that the *togetherness* that characterizes phenomenal unity is experiential. Moreover, if we consider these three specifications of phenomenal unity as simultaneous feature then the problem would be removed.

We also share Van Gulick's another comment concerning the relationship between phenomenal unity and representational unity. We think though there are different accounts in which phenomenal unity treated as 'essentially representational', yet, the entire are not equally plausible. There are two kinds of 'essential' connections between phenomenal unity and representational unity: *direct* and *indirect*.[26] In later sense, phenomenal unity requires representational unity if and only if experiences which are found phenomenally unified belongs to such experiences most of which are representationally unified with each other. Gulick accepts the connections between phenomenal unity and representational unity more direct sense. Bayne opines that Gulick's suggestion that phenomenal unity might be a 'special type or sub-domain of representational unity'– neither strikes him as plausible nor is acceptable. Bayne argues that the existence of inconsistency in the content of consciousness shows that phenomenally unity of experiences is possible without being representationally unified.

Again, following Bayne, we might say that phenomenal unity is not essentially connected for their different content. Phenomenal unity possesses 'phenomenal contents'[27]whereas representational unity possesses 'representational content'. In his words: 'Although the content of the agnostic's experiences of the car are not representationally integrated in the way that they ought to be, we have no reason to deny that they are phenomenally unified with each other within the context of a single overall visual state.'[28] So we conclude that though Gulick's objection against Bayne's notion of phenomenal unity is not apparently plausible.

IV

Conclusion:

In conclusion, we can say that we can analyze the mereological account of the unity of phenomenal consciousness through the logical analysis. Whatever have been uses in the words to explain the phenomenal unity and unity relation make a logical explanation of relation with each-other, we think that both many unity making relation theorist and single state conception theorist have been deceived by the blunder idea because whatever follows from the such question is that either phenomenal consciousness has unified character and explained it through the many unity making relation or phenomenal consciousness has unified feature and explained it only through single state conception or one experience view. We think that this exclusive disjunction is irrational because it may be that there are many unities making relation in one point of view. On the other hand, there is one experience account or/and single state conception account in another point of view. Both these expressions do not identify the unity of phenomenal consciousness as two distinct species or two distinct unities. We have observed that the aims of every unity thesis are to explain the unity of phenomenal consciousness. All these accounts only identify the various aspects of the accounts of the word's 'unity'.

Again, we find an affective, plausible, and unique account from this thesis that though some cases of behavioral dissociation and clinical disorder, person loss their unity for some moment but they actually enjoy 'overall' unity of their fine-grained phenomenal field of phenomenal consciousness level in normal and many abnormal cases. This is the uniqueness of Tim Bayne's unity thesis.

At last, the claim of Tim Bayne in respect of the unity thesis has a special force to overcome all the criticisms against the mereological account of unity made by the opponents. It is cleared that the unity thesis is clearly and distinctly established by Tim Bayne. The mereological account is not only a plausible account of phenomenal unity of consciousness, but it also a unique and acceptable theory in this field.

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From Subject to Subjectivity: A Conceptual Shift in the Discourse on Self

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Abstract

The problem of the existence of self has been addressed in multiple ways across philosophical traditions. This paper aims to look at some of the different ways in which the problem has been conceived within one particular strand of theorizing about self namely the Consciousness-based approach. The defining feature of such a strand is that it takes consciousness as the locus of self. Contrary to this approach, there are various other accounts of self, offering responses to the problem of self which can be put under the broad category namely, the Non- conscious- based approach. The former approach was made explicit in the modern philosophy by David Hume's attempt to address the issue, or this paper argues. Hume ended-up denying the existence of self as he failed to see an impression within his mind which conforms to the notion of self. However, Hume's impact is so crucial as far as the consciousness-based approach is concerned since any similar account within this strand is liable to respond in some way or other to Hume. Responding to such a concern, some philosophers think that the nature of the problem demands some key shifts away from the Humean way of conceiving the problem in order to arrive a strong affirmative account of self. This paper identifies two such contemporary consciousness-based accounts such as the ones offered by Searle (2004, 2005) and Zahavi and Kreigel (2015) respectively. A major focus of this paper is to examine how far both the accounts under consideration have moved away from Humean assumptions, how much are they close to Hume, both methodologically and conceptually, and are there any conceptual alterations that have happened down the line. Following a key conceptual shift which Zahavi and Kreigel advocate with regard to the nature of selfhood, that is from 'subject' to 'subjectivity' this paper assumes that it would

significantly reshape the question- where exactly to look for self within consciousness. By banking on this, this paper offers a plausible distinction among the consciousness-based affirmative approach, between Formal features-based account and Experience-based account of selfhood and argues that such a distinction is crucial to capture the apt locus of self. In contrast to this, the adoption of a purely Formal features-based account towards the problem fails to capture the crucial relation between self and consciousness for which Searle's account is a typical example. Such a move falls short of tracking the nature of selfhood.

Keywords : *Johns Searle, Selfhood, Formal Experiential distinction, Non Humean Self.*

1. Introduction

A classical problem in the metaphysics of self which attracted philosophers was the one regarding the existence of self. Is there something called self, as a real existent entity at all or is it just an illusion which lacks reality? Various philosophical traditions and thinkers have responded to this question either affirmatively or negatively. Famous denials of self in the history of philosophy include classical Buddhism from the eastern philosophical traditions and David Hume from the Western tradition. Notable affirmative accounts regarding the existence of self, include the theories of Descartes and Kant in the modern times. This divide continues in the contemporary times also. Miri Albahari's view is a typical example of a version of the denial of self mirroring the Buddhist point of view[1]. Albahari writes,

> "On the proposed theory of 'no-self', then, a self ……will not actually exist, although most of us will, through our very mode of living, be reflexively assuming that we are such a self. In assuming that we are such a self – a self that turns out to not actually exist – we will therefore be in the grip of a deep-seated illusion."[2]

Thomas Metzinger's view is another important one which echoes the negation of self. Metzinger denies the metaphysical reality of self and instead argues that what we have is just 'self-models'[3]. He writes, "no such things as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self"[4]. Some organisms like human beings possess *self-models* but they are nothing but complex brain states, which are sub personal states. The model should not be confused with the reality. Daniel Dennett's take on this problem also ended up in the denial of self with the conception that the notion of self we possess as a *useful fiction* which in analogical terms has the similar status of the notion of

'centre of gravity' in Newtonian Physics. Dennett's Narrative account of self, however does not claim that the notion of self that we claim to possess is without any use. It is definitely useful, he argues, in the explanation of human action and behaviour, but at the same time the self remains as the 'theorist's fiction.[5]On the other hand, John Searle's account takes an affirmative account of self, which more or less follows the Kantian lineage which takes the self as a formal requirement in order to account for agentive actions. In the phenomenological tradition, there are lot of thinkers who offer affirmative views on self and in the contemporary milieu of that tradition, Dan Zahavi's account is an important one. We will consider Searle's and Zahavi's views in detail in the course of this paper.

2. Two Major Approaches to the Problem of Self

We have had a glimpse of some of the responses to the problem of the existence of self in the previous section. Let us now turn our attention towards a different but related issue which is concerned with the classification of different theories of self into two broader categories. The basis of this sort of a classification is in some sense related to the question of how these various theories of self 'locate' the self in relation to consciousness. The point is to see how different theories of self addressed the problem of the existence of self and tried to identify the self with. The two broader categories or strands could be named as Consciousness-based strand/approach and No-consciousness-based strand/approach towards theorizing on self[6]. To identify the particular strand under which a theory falls is to ask the question; what according to that theory is the *locus* of self. A major chunk of theories view self in relation to consciousness although the relation between consciousness and self may be characterized differently in each theory. For example, in some theories for example, the self may be a principle which is responsible for the unity of consciousness, in some others; it may be part of experiential consciousness in being internal to conscious experiencing and so on. However, the point is that the self is understood as something which exists *with* consciousness as the feature of the latter.

There are some other theories which conceived the self not in relation to or without any reference to consciousness and such theories take, as I argue, a no-consciousness based approach towards the problem of self. A typical example for such an approach can be found in the group of theories which are broadly termed as social constructivist accounts/theories of self[7]. The basic thesis of social constructivism is that the self originates and persist only in the context of the social world. There is no self/subject prior to the social life of the individual and thus the self/subject is a late comer in the life of the individual as she engages in the social life. Social constructivism comes in different flavours. Some of them who take the role of language seriously holds

the view that the self as constituted by language· some think that the self or subject is constituted in and through the network of socio-political power relations, structures and so on. Narrative accounts of self form another group of theories of this sort[8]. Such accounts are opposed to the consciousness based on the point that the former does not consider self/subject as a something in relation to the individual consciousness, rather it takes the self as something which stands far off from it. The theory of self which we have briefly seen in the beginning such as Dennett's views the self a something which is unrelated to consciousness. For Dennett, the self is a useful fiction in the explanation of human behaviour and actions. The point is that though it refuted the self, such denial is based on his assumption of the self as something entirely divorced from consciousness.

Albahari's denial of self also operates in the backdrop of the denial of a particular notion of self, but her account falls under the consciousness-based strand. "The self should be understood as unified happiness seeking, unbrokenly persisting ontologically distinct conscious subject who is the owner of experiences, the thinker of thoughts and the agent of actions"[9]. On Zahavi's interpretation of Albahari, the latter considers the features of consciousness such as unity, unbrokenness and invariability to be real features of consciousness/ yet the self is illusory. This denial of self is rooted in understanding the self in relation to consciousness. Albahari considers the illusory nature of self by looking *into* consciousness and finds the absence of such an entity there.

There is yet another account of self, available in the contemporary Western philosophy which takes a non-consciousness-based approach towards the issue, but in a much different way. This view of subjectivity/self, offered recently by Shani takes autonomy as the defining feature of selfhood[10]. According to this account, consciousness has no role in constituting subjectivity or selfhood, at least in the case of certain forms of life which lies at the lower steps in the ladder of evolutionary hierarchy for example amoeba and so on. Shani argues that such systems which are dynamic systems, possess some rudimentary form of self, maintain autonomy in their engagement with the surrounding environment. They possess mechanisms for self-maintenance and survival yet they lack not only consciousness but even biological structures which generate consciousness. Shani calls such systems autonomous agents (AAs in short) and claim that they possess selves in a minimal and rudimentary form. However, consciousness is a late comer but the self is not, as per this theory. In our proposed division, this view of self plainly falls under the no-consciousness-based strand, could be marked, perhaps with the qualified term pre-consciousness-based account. However, the main concern of this paper is to consider some of the theories which come under the consciousness-based approach and other strands are kept out of its scope for that matter, as we proceed further.

3. Hume: The Modern Pioneer of the Debate

The reasons consider Hume's account as the point of departure are the following. It was Hume who raised the issue in the present form in which we discuss here and secondly, even the contemporary responses to that problem, like some of the theories which we discuss here do, refer back to the Humean formulation of the same[11]. In the section which follows this, we will consider a couple of such responses to Hume which come up from the consciousness-based approach camp. In the present section, we will quickly present the Humean formulation of the problem and consequently try to see how and why his theory of self follows the consciousness-based approach. Hume's formulation of the problem takes place in the context of his opposition to the view that there is a self and we feel its continuous existence. It is interesting to note that how Hume respond to his denial of the self in the first place. "Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor we have we any idea of self"[12]. The first part of Hume's argument is an indicator that his way of looking at the self is essentially a consciousness-based approach. So, the conception of self which this theory tries to capture also takes consciousness as the locus of self, the ideal/right place to look for the self. Hume in opposing this view, also states that the idea of self has to be derived from the corresponding impression of self since according to him,

"It must be one impression, that gives rise to every real idea". This is the conceptual problem for Hume since the definition of self does not match with this above said thesis. "But the self/person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppose'd to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same thro' the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable"[13].

The self which Hume searched for is thus an invariable and continuously existing state of consciousness. Moreover, the self is supposed be a possessor of all our other variable/changing states of mind. One may disagree with Hume in this point but the point to notice here is that Hume has identified consciousness as the locus of self[14]. It is in this light, his oft-quoted famous dictum, which is the statement of his denial of self, has to be understood.

"For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other,…I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions

are removed for anytime, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of *myself*, and may truly be said not to exist."[15]

Being conscious, for Hume is a necessary pre-requisite to have a self. An actual awakened state of consciousness is required for the selfhood to exist. Selfhood, on this Humean picture requires the sensibility to one's conscious mind to find ones' self. Interestingly, Hume could find only impressions of his perceptions within his mind and not any self there. So, he negated its existence. Hume of course took an introspective pathway in the search for the self. Introspection as a method of knowing one's own mental states or minds has got its own shortcomings, but that in itself does not create any problem in attributing the consciousness- based approach to self to Hume[16]. All the same, his commitment to the locus of self remains the same, which is consciousness alone.

4. Two Contemporary Responses to Hume's View

In this section, we are going to consider two recent responses to Hume's denial of self. One response is from John Searle and the other is from Dan Zahavi (and Uriah Kreigel)[17]. The former one takes on Hume and explicitly argues for a non-Huemean account of self, but the latter does not directly respond to Hume but its implications makes it a potentially non-Humean theory. Both Searle and Zahavi agree and disagree with Hume. The common point of agreement between these two views is that both agree that the self is a real existent and therefore are opposed to Hume in that connection. Another point where they come together and perhaps join hands with Hume is that they subscribe to the consciousness-based approach to the problem of self. Let us first consider both these views separately and in the next two sections before coming back to a critical analysis of both.

A) Searle's Formal Feature Account of Self

John Searle has recently offered a theory of self by responding to the same question which bothered Hume sometime back; "What is it about me, about my personal experiences that makes me sense myself as a continuing entity through time, which is in addition to the continuity of my body?"[18] It is important to see that Searle raises the problem from a first-person point of view. Searle, much in the same way Hume did, focusses onto his own consciousness/mind to find the self. Searle was led by the conviction that the self is something which must be related to the mental make-up of the individual and not external to it. An important pointed to be understood here is that Searle does not depend on introspection to search for self. His method was first-person

oriented one but it is a non-introspective one and this point will be discussed later on when we deal with Searle's theory in detail. However, just as it happened in the case of Hume where he could not find a single impression which meets the requirements of being the self, Searle also did not find any such entity within his own mind which should qualify as his self. Up to this point, he is in complete agreement with Hume. Searle thus writes,

If I turn my attention inward and examine all the experiences I am now having, none of them would I call my "self". I feel the shirt on my back, the after taste of coffee in my mouth, a slight hangover headache from last night, and the sight of trees outside my window, but none of these is a self and none of them would count as a self. So what then is this self? I think Hume is absolutely right; there is no experience of this entity[19].

And yet it is interesting to notice that Searle's proposal does not take the self as illusory either. Searle has a specific reason to do so and it is something related to his theory of action and free will. Searle while engaging with his theory of rational action talks about three 'gaps' in the performance of every action. They are as follows; 1) between prior intention and decision and 2) between decision and the initiation of relevant bodily movements and 3) between initiation and the completion of action. For example, when I raise my arm to grab the teacup on my table, I had some prior intention that my hand should be raised prior to arriving at a decision. In between them, there is an alleged metaphysical gap. Even when I have decided to raise my hand, between this and the initiation of the movement of my hand, there is a gap. Even when I raise my hand, that is not sufficient to complete the action, I have to push myself into that movement for quite a long time. The crucial feature is that none of the steps which comes prior to the latter in the given set is sufficient to determine the latter. Human actions are rational actions and Searle characterises them as having a feature namely 'acting on reasons'. This sort of characterisation of human actions are contrasted to those which happen to one causally. Agency, according to Searle's view is the capacity to 'initiate and complete actions'. Rational actions, actions which are governed by reasons presuppose the free will from the part of the agent. For example, if I decide to have a cold coffee and this decision, if not executed by initiating the required bodily movements would never be an action. It is in such gaps, free will operates and this necessitates the logical requirement of a principle which is responsible for agency and to operate in the gaps. This capacity without doubt requires the capacity for consciousness according to Searle. And in addition to this, this entity must be something which has agency and the capacity to maintain free will by operating in the gaps. Thus, Searle's theory of self in his own words is as follows;

> It has to be an entity, such that one and the same entity has consciousness, perception, rationality, the capacity to organize perceptions and reasons, so as to perform voluntary actions on the presupposition of freedom. If you have got all that, you have a self[20].

It is important to note that the self which is conscious doesn't reveal itself in consciousness. Searle makes this point so clear when he draws the analogy between his notion of self and that of the point of view in the case of visual perception. "In order to understand my visual perceptions, I have to understand them as occurring from a point of view, but the point of view itself is not something that I see or otherwise perceive"[21]. At this point, Searle's view looks compatible with the Humean view that there is no self, *available in experience* as a part of it. In the Humean case, the search for self is introspective reflection while for Searle, it is more of a logical requirement that there must be an entity which unifies or holds various experiences and components of actions together. This explains why Searle's account is a formal view of self and not a substantive view. In the Humean case, the search was on a wrong place, in a corner of consciousness where the self cannot be present, for one cannot find the self as an object of one's introspection, but Searle's view places the self as a feature of consciousness which lies in the onlooker-side. The self, like the point view has no substantive features other than the one which it satisfies, that is, the formal requirement that that all my experience refers back to it or exist or originate from that point of view. This feature makes the self as something which is 'invisible' in experience according to Searle's view or this paper argues.

B) Zahavi's Account of Minimal/ Experiential Self

Another recent theory of self which in a way responds to Hume is offered by Dan Zahavi. This account is rooted in the Phenomenological tradition. Zahavi's formulation of his account of self is rooted in his interpretations of the writings of later Husserl and later Sartre. Recently, Uriah Kriegel also joined with Zahavi in defending the notion of minimal self[22]. The problem to which Zahavi responds is as follows; can there be an alternative account of selfhood available which can eventually replace theories which negate the existence of self ? Zahavi mainly targets to oppose the accounts offered by Miri Albahai and Thomas Metzinger. In that respect, his criticism of Hume is indirect. The conceptions of self defended and refuted by Albahari and Metzinger however is consistent with that of Hume. So, it is right to place Zahavi's view against Hume's view. Zahavi's main criticism against them is that they presuppose a particular account of self and it that self which they deny. They consider the self as an unchanging principle of consciousness amidst all the changing states of the latter. For that reason,

both Albahari's and Metzinger's accounts are not phenomenologically apt in the sense that in denying the reality of self they miss the exact way in which experiences are given to the subject from her first-person point of view. Zahavi writes, "Metzinger took the self to be a process independent ontological substance that might exist all by itself, that is in isolation from the rest of the world and since he denied the existence of any such entity, and concluded that no such things as selves exist"[23]. He also argues that Albahari repeats the mistake of Metzinger and thus failed to capture the actual nature of self. "On Albahari's view, the self, purports to be ontologically independent, independent from the experiences and objects it is subject of, and since it doesn't really possess this status, it lacks this essential property of selfhood, it ultimately be regarded as illusory"[24]. He also puts forth his disagreement about self-sceptics in the following manner; "My worry is that many self-sceptics are implicitly endorsing a very traditional reified understanding of what self is. They seem committed to the view that a self, if it exists- must be some kind of ontologically independent invariant principle of identity that stands apart from and above the stream of changing experiences"[25]. This criticism which levelled directly against both Albahari and Metzinger, is applicable to both Hume and Searle as well, or as I argue[26]. This is for the reason that they also define self as something which lies over and above the very process of experiencing and that which unifies the manifold of experiences, and subsequently, fails to find such an entity there[27].

Zahavi's proposal is that there is an alternative account possible. He follows the insights of Husserl and Sartre in this regard. He says, "for both Husserl and Sartre, an understanding of what it means to be a self, calls for an examination of the structure of experience and vice versa"[28]. This sort of an enquiry points to the fact that Zahavi's account of self takes consciousness/experience as the locus of self. Zahavi writes, "Indeed for both of them the self, referred to is not something standing beyond or opposed to the stream of experiences but it is rather a crucial aspect of our experiential life"[29].

On Zahavi's account, the self has to be characterised in terms of a feature of consciousness namely '*ipseity*' or for-me-ness of experience'. Zahavi explains this feature of experience in the following manner. "It doesn't refer to a specific experiential content, to a specific *what*, nor does it refer to the diachronic or synchronic sum of such content, or to some relation that might obtain between the contents in question. Rather it refers to the distinctive givenness or *how* of experience"[30]. Although it is an experientially real feature of consciousness, Zahavi distances himself from identifying this feature i.e. the *ipsiety* or for-me-ness with any perceptual qualitative features like colour, taste etc.[31]At the same time, for-me-ness is akin to experiences. The for-me-ness is constitutive of the subjective charecter of consciousness. Zahavi thus says that "the most basic form of selfhood is the one constituted by the very self-manifestation of experience"[32]. For example, when I undergo multiple modalities of conscious experience

at a particular time, all those experiences are qualitatively different, yet they are all given to *me*, they are *my* experiences in a specific way. This differentiates the givenness of the sameset of experiences to any other person because when she undergoes such an experience, it is *her* experience.

Zahavi elaborates his view by arguing as follows, "On this view, there is no pure experience independent self. The self is the very subjectivity of experience and not something that exists independently of the experiential flow; the experiences are world-directed experiences. At the same time, they involve self-presence and hence a subjective point of view"[33].

5. From Subject to Subjectivity: A Crucial Step

Hume, Searle and Zahavi take consciousness as the locus of selfhood in different ways. While Hume rejects the reality of self, Searle claims that Hume is right in rejecting the reality of self but Searle takes a realist position with respect to the existence of self and parts company with Hume in eventually. As discussed in the session that Searle's project requires a self which unifies experience and stand as the subject beyond the different changes in experiences. The result is that there is a self which in some sense transcends the givenness of consciousness yet shapes the latter by holding its various components together. This implies that the self exists as a part of consciousness, but it is not *available* in experience. Why is this so in Searle's account? One reason could be that Searle followed the Humeanintuitions (though he claimed that his account is non-Humean) in both defining the self as well as in searching for the self. The notion of self that Searle was trying to capture in experience is a principle which remains unchanging in the midst of the flux. This sort of a conception of self is the same as the one shared by Hume as well (The respective accounts of Albahari and Metzinger more or less also shares the same conception but to reject the same). This subsequently forced him to posit a formal self, which exist as non-available in experience. The significant point here is that both Hume and Searle looked inside the mind, failed to see a self there. One denied its existence completely, the other identified it in some unreachable location within consciousness itself.

In contrast to this, Zahavi views self as something which is available in experience, as the basic form of experiencing which constitutes the very subjectivity of experience. It is important to see that Zahavi's takes an approach which is different from both Hume's and Searle's accounts. Rather than searching for a self which lies above the streaming of consciousness, it searches for a self *within* experiential consciousness. Both Searle and Zahavi identifies consciousness as the locus of the self but their actual difference lies at in catching hold of the exact locus of self and it is a very crucial difference. To capture the difference between these two views, let us

employ the distinction between Formal feature-based strand and Experiential feature-based strand of consciousness-based theories of self. First group can be identified as considering the phenomenon of consciousness as involving a both formal and experiential features. The formal features of consciousness are those features which are non-available to the experiencer, yet they allegedly structure the conscious experiencing. Experiential features are those which are those available features of consciousness for the experiencer. Those who support the experiential view consider that there is nothing in consciousness which is at least in principle not be available to the subject of consciousness. Those who support the formal feature view of consciousness regard it is not the case. For them the process of looking into ones' own consciousness leaves out the point of view from which the very process of looking happens since the latter is a formal feature of consciousness which enables the process of looking. In other words, the actual subjective side of consciousness is blind to itself. That amounts to placing the subjective side of consciousness. Following this, one way of visualizing that is to say that in Zahavi's case, it is the subjective-side of consciousness where the self is located. Hume searches for the self in the object-ive side of consciousness which can present before a subject only the objects and contents of consciousness. While the subjectivity is experientially given on the subjective side. Searle's location for self, according to this formulation is neither on the subject-ive side nor on the object-ive side, but completely out of both. On such an interpretation, one can see that both Hume and Searle looked for the self in wrong-places. This sort of a search for the self is motivated by the definition of self which they adopted for their respective enquiries. They took the self/subject as a permanently existing continuous element which can be seen as an object of experience like any other objects of experience. The self/'subject' thus gets the connotation of a mental object. For Searle, the mere absence of such a subject (mental object) was dissatisfactory and thus he places the self as a formal (non-experiential) feature of consciousness in order to offer a non-Humean account, but still with the Humean baggage. The formal self or the self on the formal side of consciousness as we have seen is neither on the objective side nor on the subjective side of consciousness. This has a bearing on Searle's call for postulating a self if there is no self that Hume could find with his introspective procedure.

Zahavi on the other hand argues that "self experience does not require the experience *of* something invariant". Subjectivity thus forms a much stronger notion to capture the notion of self. It locates the self as the *how* of experience rather than the *what* or *the object* of experience.

> An effective way to capture this basic point is to replace the traditional phrase "subject of experience" with the phrase "subjectivity of experience." Whereas the first phrasing might suggest that the self is something that exists apart from, or above,

> the experience and, for that reason, is something that might be encountered in separation from the experience or even something the experience may occasionally lack, the second phrasing excludes these types of misunderstanding. It makes no sense to say that the subjectivity of the experience is something that can be detached or isolated from the experience, or to say that it is something the experience can lack. To stress the subjectivity of experience is not an empty gesture; it is to insist on the basic ipseity of the experiential phenomena.[34]

6. Concluding Remarks

We have seen the two recent responses to the problem of the existence of self which were raised in the form of self-scepticism by Hume. Against Hume, both Searle and Zahavi offers affirmative accounts of self. They share the insight that the locus of self is consciousness. But they radically differ in their respective characterisation of the nature of self. Searle keeps the traditional account of self which Hume also defended even while trying to offer a non-Humean account of self. He followed the Humean intuition throughout in his enquiry and ended up finding no self *within* consciousness. So, Searle offered a non-experiential account of self which eventually fails to capture the exact nature of selfhood. He sticks on to the notion of subject as an invariant unifying feature of consciousness.

Zahavi on the other hand tries to offer a theory by claiming that the self is something which must be identified as the subjectivity of experience. He thus replaces the Humean baggage of the notion of self. The shift from subject to subjectivity in Zahavi's schema thus accounts for the experiential nature of the selfhood in the way it is given in experience. The minimal self, constituted by the experientially real feature of consciousness such as for-me-ness forms the basic form of self or core-self. Zahavi's account does not demand that the self must be introspected in order to be aware of it. On the contrary, it argues that the self is always present in an experientially real manner in all world-immersed activities of the individual. The call for the shift from subject to subjectivity in Zahavi's account therefore is an attempt to capture the phenomenally real feature of consciousness that is the sense-of self as a serious element for a theory of self[35]. Thus, Zahavi's account succeeds to a great extend to tie the self with consciousness compared to Searle's account. Within the consciousness-based strand camp, Zahavi's theory which takes the experiential account of self goes a step ahead of Searle's theory which offers a non-experiential (formal) account.

Notes

[1] *Miri Albahari* (*2006*). Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self. Palgrave Macmillan.

[2] Ibid P.2

[3] Metzinger, T. (2003) Being No One. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

[4] Ibid. p.

[5] Daniel D. (1992) The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity in F. Kessel, P. Cole and D. Johnson, eds, Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum

[6] This sort of categorization may not exhaust all the theories of self, available in the philosophical literature, but it might cover quite a few prominent theories.

[7] This group include thinkers such as Royce, Mead, Foucault, Althusser etc. This kind of theorizing need not be inconsistent with the view that consciousness is the locus of self though.

[8] A detailed discussion of the narrative view was offered by MaryaSchetchman in her seminal article The Narrative Self (2011).

[9] *Miri Albahari* (2006). Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self. Palgrave Macmillan, p.3

[10] Shani, Itay, Against Consciousness Chauvinism, The Monist (2014) 91 (2): 294-332

[11] It is not to forget John Locke's' conception of self in relation to consciousness or what he calls 'memory' in this context. John Locke's view could well be a consciousness-based approach, perhaps an important one in the modern period, but our focus is on the debate about the existence of self which took shape with Hume's entry into the scene.

[12] Hume, D.(1978) A Treatise on Human Nature, Selby L.A- Bigge (eds.), Oxford Clarendon Press, p.251

[13] Ibid.

[14] Cartesian theory of self which places the essence of the latter in thought/consciouness is not discounted here, Hume's formulation in fact shook the foundations of such a substantial view from an empiricist point of view.

[15] Ibid. p.252.

[16] Charle's Siewert and John Searle have formulated critiques of Introspection recently.

[17] Kreigel and Zahavi wrote an article recently to defend the notion of 'for-me-ness' which account for the minimal notion of self. The notion of minimal self which we discuss here has appeared many times in print to the credit of Zahavi. So this account we discuss here is shared by both. I have used Zahavi's monographs on most of the occassions here.

[18] Searle, J.R. (1992). Mind: A Brief Introduction, Oxford, p. 290

[19] Ibid. 292.

[20] Ibid. 293.

[21] Ibid. 295

[22] Zahavi Dan and kriegel Uriah, For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not Forthcoming in D. O. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou, and W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches (London: Routledge, 2015)

[23] Zahavi Dan, The Illusory Self in Gallagher Shaun, The Oxford handbook of Self, p.324

[24] Ibid

[25] Ibid

[26] Zahavi has raised a similar point of criticism against Searle's view somewhere else.

[27] Zahavi interestingly points out that the narrative account of self, offered by Ricour was in fact oriented on a strategy to come out of the traditional dilemma of having to choose between the Cartesian notion of the principle of identity and the Humean and Nietzchean positions who held that an identical subject to be nothing but a substantial illusion. Narrative identity, Ricour argues can include changes and mutations within the life time.

[28] Zahavi Dan (2011) The Illusory Self in Gallagher Shaw, The Oxford Handbook of Self, P.324.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Zahavi Dan, The Experiential Self: Objections and Replies.

[31] In fact, Zahavi agrees to Kreigel's distinction between two components of conscious experience such as its qualitative character and subjective character. Thus, it is evident that he takes subjectivity as a feature of conscious experience. Yet it is not free from further criticisms such as the one raised by Martine Nida- Rumelin that the above said division accepted by Zahavi still views subject like any other object of experience, because both the components of experiencing are in the same ontological plane.

[32] Ibid

[33] Zahavi does not say that the notion of minimal self, predicated on the notion of for-me-ness of experience as the complete description of our subjective lives. The latter includes more components, but the point is that for all such complexes such as social self, and so on, the minimal or core self is a necessary requirement.

[34] Zahavi Dan, Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First Person Perspective, MIT Press, 2005. p.126

[35] Taking the notion of 'subjectivity ' to capture selfhood may be interpreted as inadequate because of its affinity towards the notion of 'process '. However, such an interpretation does not go well with what Zahavi takes the self to be. Subjectivity is a fundamental and unchanging feature of consciousness. So, this way, to an extent, Zahavi's view could do away with the inadequacies of the traditional conception of self as an unchanging entity by giving a new dimension to this very unchanging subjectivity.

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Collective Intentions and the fear of Group Mind: A Philosophical Analysis

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Abstract

Groups or collectives are typically constituted of individuals but what we call group intentions are not simply a summation of individual intentions. How is this contradiction explained by philosophers is what I am concerned with in this paper. My main aim is to explain the various ways in which collective intentions have been understood and explained by philosophers. Here, my main focus is on the accounts which resist from reducing collective intentions to a summation of individual intentions. I have put up an argument that the main reason why philosophers shy away from accepting a bearer of collective intentional states beyond the individual is a fear of group mind. In doing so, I have also briefly explained the group mind thesis as has been understood in recent philosophical discussions. I have divided the accounts of collective intentions under three categories where the last category has been discussed in the form of a possibility.I have argued that group mind, no matter how absurd it might seem, definitely appears a genuine philosophical possibility in any discussion of collective actions or collective intentions for that matter.

Keywords: *Collective Intentions, Intentionality, Collective action, Group mind, Collective responsibility.*

Introduction

A conceptual bondage between an action and the relevant intentions is an accepted fact. What separates genuine actions from occurrences and happenings is the intentional involvement on the part of the agent. But, do we always act alone? There are several

examples in our day to day lives which reflect that we, many times, act with others as a group or a collective.This claim can be instantiated with examples such as: 'The Parliament passed threelawsrelated to farm produce'; 'WHO issued new guidelines for Countries severely affected with COVID-19 pandemic'; 'Apple Inc. launched a new version of MacBook Pro', and so on. All these examples indicate the actions of a group and not of any individual. In contemporary philosophical literature, there have been several attempts at analysing actions performed by groups or collectives. However, if there are genuine collective actions how are they to be accounted for? By genuine collective action I mean the actions which could be attributed to the *group as a whole* and not to any individual member or certain members constituting the group. If individual intentions are required for the explanation of individual human actions, the logic suggests that the possibility of genuine collective actions would also compel us to talk about the possibility of collective intentions.But, what role do intentions play when we talk about actions of a group? Can it be regarded that just as individual intentions guide individual actions and help in structuring individual actions, the same thing be said about collective intentions as well. These issues become even more intriguing in view of the fact that following the long philosophical tradition with an apparent Cartesian legacy prompt most of thephilosophers to take intentionality to be essentially an individual phenomenon.

My main aim in this paper is to understand the idea of collective intentions. Here, I shall be specifically concerned with contemporary attempts made by philosophers of mind and action in analysing collective intentions. I shall attempt to explore if the contemporary accounts follow the established tradition of keeping individuals at the centre of all philosophical discussions? Or, is it that there is an attempt to go beyond the individualistic explanations of collective intentions in their accounts? The paper is divided into three sections apart from the introduction and the conclusion. The first section elaborates the meaning of collective intentionality and collective intentions exploring the subtle difference between the two. In the second section, I shall look at some of the philosophical accounts of collective intentions. In section three, I shall try to critically review the accounts whereby I shall try to place them in three different categories. The third category would be discussed in the form of a possibility of further extension of the existing theses.

The meaning of Collective Intentionality

Philosophically, 'intentionality' is a technical term used to denote the capacity of the minds by which mental states refer to objects or state of affairs in the world other than themselves. If, for example, I have a belief, it must be a belief *about* something. If, I have a fear, it must be a fear *of* something or that something will occur. If, I have a desire, it must be a desire*to do* something or that something *should* be the case. If, I

have an intention, it must be an intention *to do* something, and so on. "Intending" is a kind of intentionality like beliefs, desires, fears, and so on. For the purpose of the present work, I shall concentrate my attention on this aspect of intentionality with regard to collectives or groups.[1]

Before digging deeper into an analysis of collective intentions, it is important to first understand its meaning. As mentioned above, collective intentions is one mode of collective intentionality along with others such as shared belief, collective acceptance, and collective emotion. Collective intentionality is the power of minds to be jointly directed at objects, matters of fact, states of affairs, goals, or values.[2] This is done with the help of its various modes. For instance, in shared belief there is some common knowledge against whose backdrop some relevant information which we want to share with others become salient. Moreover, in the case of shared intention, the participants (members of the group participating in the intention) act together intentionally in a coordinated and cooperative fashion in order to achieve common goals.[3] This coordination and cooperation is ensured with the help of various factors such as mutual knowledge about the intentions of others, mutual belief that others are also having same intentions, common purpose, and common goals.[4] Lack of coordination, cooperation, mutual knowledge, and mutual belief makes it difficult for the group in attaining the common goal or the common purpose. It is considered to be fairly a recent term some explicit conceptions of which could be found in early social and sociological theory.[5] But, in the history of philosophy, concept wise, it has appeared and reappeared. This is evident in notions such as Aristotle's concept of *koinonía* or common striving, Jean Jacques Rousseau's idea of *volonté generale* or collective will. It is also visible in notions such as the spirit of people or nations as developed in German Idealism or the Historical School of Law.[6]A reflection of it could be also seen in the works of Robin G. Collingwood and Wilfred Sellars.[7]

One common sense way of understanding the ascription of intentional states to groups is that such an ascription is merely metaphorical. This means that when we ascribe intentions to groups for their actions, it is merely for facilitating explanation and to create a better effect in the mind of others and nothing apart from that. However, this view is not much accepted in philosophical circles. One prime reason for this is that the attribution of 'responsibility' requires that groups be construed as literal subjects of intentional states. The focal point is the *group as a whole* and not as a fragmented entity comprising of a loose collection of individuals. We cannot attribute the action or even the responsibility of the action to a single individual or even some individuals.[8] Apart from this, the ascription of intentional states to groups has explanatory advantages as well. This advantage is reflected when we ascribe responsibility to groups. It allows us in predicting and explaining the actions of groups better.

Another view, which is also the predominant view, holds that what we call collective intention is nothing but a mere aggregation or summation of the intentions of the individual members of the group. This view is referred to as the summative account of collective intentions.[9] Antony Quinton is one of the proponents of the summative account.[10] Those who are opposed to this view hold that collective intentions involve a sense of acting and willing something together and cannot just be regarded as a mere summation of individual intentions.[11] Intentionality is in itself something human beings can share. Individual intentions involved in this enterprise are derived from collective intentions, and the individual intentions that are derived from the collective intentions will often have different"content" from that of the collective intentions. Raimo Toumela, John Searle, Michael Bratman, and Margaret Gilbert endorse the non-summative view of collective intentions. They are primarily concerned about unfurling the complexities involved in the notion of collective intentions as the underlying mental state in any collective action.

It could be very well understood from the above discussion that the main philosophical challenge in the analysis of collective intentions is in the tension within the expression "individuals as a group".[12] We can have a first personal understanding of one's intentions, but any intrusion into the intentions of others is difficult to imagine and this is what is implied when we talk about group or collective intentions. So, in most of the cases, collective intentions are ultimately interpreted by considering the relevant attitudes of the constituent individuals. They are dependent on and reducible to the individual intentions.This view is called individualism. However, in certain cases attempts are made to go beyond the individualist construal of collective intentions. One of the major aims of this paper is to see how the thesis of collective intentionality has progressed through various accounts of philosophers and how their individual shortcomings are addressed and readdressed by subsequent writers. As we proceed from one to the other, I have attempted to show that we reach closer from an individualistic towrads a collectivistic explanation of collective intentions.

Collective Intentions: Some contemporary Accounts

Raimo Toumela, is one of the initiators of the debate surrounding collective intentions. He holds that social actions are distinct from individual actions. They are different in the sense that in social situations other person's actions are also centrally relevant to one's actions and vice versa. This obviously is not the case in individual actions. The joint actions are a species of 'other-regarding' intentions relating to cases of joint social action.[13] In social actions, the existence of other agents and social institutions is conceptually presupposed. These actions are performed by more than one agent, for example, carrying a table to a room upstairs, playing badminton,

conversing, and so on. Whenever we talk of such joint or collective actions, we must be cognizant of the intentions, which back up such actions. According to Toumela, the intentions behind collective actions themselves have to be collective. Collective intentions explain not only joint actions but also all the social phenomena and structures that rely on such collective actions.[14]In Toumela's explanatory framework, collective intentions are symbolically represented as "we-intentions" and individual intentions as "I-intentions".

It is important to note that in Toumela's analysis none of the agent constituting the group can be said to perform the joint action intentionally as a collective if any one of them lacked the relevant we-intentions expressing the agents' common goal even if she has the constitutive part intentions (intentions to do one's part in the total action).[15] For example, in case of a cricket match, a batsman A is interested in doing his part by making the maximum amount of runs but intends to do something by which the team doesn't win the match. Such a player cannot be said to we-intend to do X (in this case we-intend that the team wins the match, X) even though he has the relevant participatory intentions. An agent, therefore, must act according to two requirements. First, she must perform her part so that the participating agents succeed in doing the collective action X, and second that her doing her part in that situation is conducive to the total action X.

In addition to sharing the relevant we-intentions, each agent must have a belief about every other agent that the other would intentionally do his part of the total action and would strive to attain the common goal by performing his contributory part. Toumela along with Karlo Miller call these beliefs among the constituent members, "mutual beliefs".[16] Focusing on cases of joint action and the respective intentional states, they analyse an individual agent's we-intentions regarding a joint activity in the form of a schema:[17]

A member A_i of a collective G we-intends to do X if and only if:

1. A_i intends to do his part of X;
2. A_i has a belief to the effect that the joint action opportunities for X will obtain, especially that at least a sufficient number of the full-fledged and adequately informed members of G, as required for the performance of X, (or at least probably will) do their parts of X;
3. A_i believes that there is (or will be) a mutual belief among the participants of G to the effect that the joint action opportunities for X will obtain.

A mutual belief that everyone will do the joint action X, consists in everyone's believing that everyone will do X and everyone's believing that everyone believes that

everyone will do X.[18]In other words, a mutual belief in the performance of an action X is the belief that the other agent (or agents) in joint action would intentionally do their part of the joint action. All the participants in the joint action must share the action prompting we-intentions. Such mutual knowledge or belief is central not only to Toumela's interpretation of collective intentions but social sciences as a whole.With the understanding of Toumela's construal of joint intentions or collective intentions, it will be interesting to see how Searle develops his account.

John Searle'saccount of collective intentions is non-summative as well as individualistic.[19] Searle holds that collective intentions are different from the individual intentional states of the constituent members. Thus, endorsing a non-summative explanation, Searle resorts to a collectivistic analysis of collective intentions. Searle claims that collective intentions cannot be reduced to the mere summation of individual intentions of the form "I intend to do X".[20]In fact, not only that we-intentions (collective intentions) cannot be reduced to I-intentions (individual intentions) but also that they cannot be reduced to I-intentions supplemented with mutual beliefs (the view held by Toumela).[21]However, it is also individualistic in a sense because all intentions — individual and collective—are, according to Searle, ultimately held by the individuals. They are first personal even in the collective case.

For Searle, the individual human beings are the ultimate repositories of all intentionality, whether individual or collective. Even if the intentionality in question makes reference to the collective, it has to be possessed by individual agents only. For example, if I am doing X (I-intentions) as a part of "Our doing Y" (we-intentions), both the intentions are in my mind alone. Though the intentionality involved in collective behaviour makes reference to the collective, it is ultimately possessed by the participating individuals. Hence, there is no need of any metaphysical entity like 'group minds'.

In the case of collective behaviour, the individual intentions are derived from collective intentions. The I-intentions are a part of the larger we-intentions. Moreover, it is also quite often the case that in the collective behaviour the derived individual intentions have different content from we-intentions. For example, whereas the we-intentions could be: "we are playing a cricket match", the individual intentions would be: "I am fielding" or "I am balling". This means that the constituting I-intentions exist in the form of a contribution to the overall we- intentions and not as the whole we-intentions. For example, a player A has a contributory I-intention as a part of the performance of the orchestra with a we-intention. The I-intentions is thus shaped up and determined by we-intentions. In a collective intentional action, the means is individual whereas the goal is collective (The goal is, we are doing Y, the means is, I am doing X as a part of our doing Y). The individual act is a part of the collective act. However, ultimately the bearer of the mental states remains the individual.

Another philosophical account of collective intentions is given by Michael Bratman. In an influential series of books and papers, Bratman has developed an account of shared activity and shared intentions, which involves a pair of agents. Unlike Searle, Bratman uses the phrase 'shared intentions' instead of collective intentions.[22] But, like Searle he also endorses an account of collective intentions, which is non-summative but individualistic in nature. Intentions, according to him, are distinctive attitudes that are central to our understanding of us as intelligent agents.[23] He is mainly concerned with smaller collectives such as singers in a duet, partners in carrying a piano upstairs and so on.

According to Bratman, having a similar intentions does not necessarily make it the case of a shared intentions. These intentions may just be coincidental with one agent having no idea whether the other one is having the same intention. He provides an understanding of the role of shared intentions in the lives of the agents by laying down three features.[24] First, shared intentions help in coordinating the activities of the agents involved in such a way that it facilitates the pursuance of a common goal. Second, shared intentions help coordinate the planning. It helps in coordinating the plans of one agent (for the performance of the task at hand) with the plans of the other agent. Third, it helps in structuring the relevant bargaining as to 'how' the task is to be performed. It enables a bargaining between the conflicting preferences of both the partners to allow the performance of the joint action. Further, the intentions of the participants are subject to the demands of consistency and coherence. It implies that intentions are subject to a demand for stability. An agent who too easily reconsiders her prior intentions would be a less reliable partner in social coordination.[25]

Shared intentions in Bratman's treatise consist in the 'interlocking web of attitudes of the participating agents and the interrelationships between those attitudes. However, it may be asked here that an agent is in control of her actions and, therefore, can intend for herself, how is it possible for a single agent to intend to perform a joint action? A joint action for that matter is not under the direct control of a single agent. How does the conception of the joint action get into the intentions of the individuals?[26] Bratman attempts to answer this question with the help of the introduction of a new notion of *intending that* instead of *intending to.* The *intending that* enables the joint activity (which he terms as J-ing) to be included in the content of the individual intentions. This condition involves an influence condition whereby one agent can affect the role of the other in the joint action. If one *intends that* something be the case, then one shall play the role of a facilitator. We will make sure that the desired action be brought about even though it is not fully under one's control. For example, Mr X may intend that his son clear the engineering examination. He would then get his son enrolled in a good coaching institute, provide him all necessary guidance. In this way, he shall perform such actions that bring about the task at hand.

According to Bratman:[27]

We intend to J if and only if

1. (a) I intend thatwe J and (b) you intend that we J.
2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1(a), 1(b), and meshing sub plans of 1a and 1b; you intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1(a), 1(b), and meshing sub plans of 1a and 1b.
3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us.

This view introduces an additional condition for the meshing (instead of matching) of sub plans. It takes into account 'how' the joint action is to be performed. The introduction of the meshing condition enables a relevant bargaining as to how the task is to be performed.

Bratman's construal of shared intentions is 'individualistic in spirit' because it consists of primarily of attitudes of individual participants and their interrelationships. The coordinated planning, action, and the relevant framework for bargaining which are the characteristics of shared intentions emerge from a proper functioning of the attitudes of the individual participants. He tries to include joint activity in the content of individual intentional agency. The content of the intentions of participating individual is collective in the sense that it unifies and coordinates individual intentional actions towards a common or shared goal (this common goal is to be accepted by each participant).

We shall now move to the discussion of Gilbert's account of collective intentions. It will be interesting to note that her account differs from the above three by moving a step further towards the real essence of collectivity.

Gilbert begins her analysis of a social group or a collective phenomenon, with a bare minimal collective of two people going for a walk together.[28]She considers this case as a paradigm of social phenomenon. For Gilbert if two people are walking along next to each other that does not make it the case that they are walking together. What then is required for two people to go on a walk 'together'? In answering this question, Gilbert makes a distinction between the *weak shared personal goals* and the *strong shared personal goals*. In her view, it is not sufficient for both the partners to have individual personal goals for the performance of any joint action. This, in fact, is the *weak sense* of shared intentions. In the strong sense, she includes a condition of *common knowledge* of the goal in question. This condition implies that each partner has a complete knowledge of the other's goal. Gilbert holds that though the common knowledge condition is a necessary proviso, but can not be regarded as sufficient as it lacks the *obligations* and *entitlements* or *rights* that form an inherent part of any collective phenomenon.The crucial elements in Gilbert's characterisation are—an explicit exchange of promise, obligations, and entitlements.

When both the parties involved in the action have *jointly* expressed their willingness to join hands with each other in accepting the common goal (in this case to walk in each other's company) a 'plural subject' is constituted. The individual participants then act not in their individual capacity but as a participant in the plural subject. She says—[29]

> Each one's (the participants) expression of willingness to walk with the other in conditions of common knowledge, is logically sufficient for them to be plural subjects of the relevant goal, and hence to go for a walk together

In Gilbert's analysis, when agents jointly commit as a body to perform an action a'plural subject' is constituted. The formation of a 'plural subject' towards a common goal is routed through the formation of 'pool of wills'. The pool of wills is formed when the individual agents offer their individual wills to be bound towards the achievement of the common goal. A plural subject is an entity, or as Gilbert puts it, "a special kind of thing, a *'synthesis sui generis*' formed when individuals bond or unite in a particular way.[30]This "special kind of thing" can be the subject to which intentional states and psychological attributes are accredited. Thus, in Gilbert's analysis, under certain circumstances individuals performing a joint action form a plural subject and this subject is the legitimate subject of the ascription of intentional states.

Thus, it is clearly evident from Gilbert's construal of plural subject that it is not only a metaphorical ascription, it indicates towards something of a literal makeup.

Collective intentions: A critical Analysis

From the above discussion, it is clear thata major point of the debate lies in identifying the locus of the collective intentional states. Most of the philosophers agree in accepting that collective intentions could not be reduced to the intentions of the individual participants. However, they are not ready to accept any such entity like the group minds or collective minds as the bearer of the collective intentional states. One of the most prominent philosophical reasons for not being able to endorse any such entity as group minds may be the inability to explain a metaphysically doubtful entity. This reason holds that groups cannot be said to exist as subjects in the same way as individual intentional subjects exist. Holding the ontological existence of a collective with a mind of its own is difficult to prove in concrete philosophical terms.[31]

But, if collective intentions have to be ultimately traced back to the individual participants, why can it not be said to be a summation of individual intentions? For advancing a methodically correct explanation, we can categorize the above discussed philosophical views on collective intentions under three heads—

1. *There could be a position that clearly says that collective intentions exist in individual minds.*

As far as this position is concerned, the accounts Searle and Bratman are particularly significant. They, in their major works, have vehemently rejected any metaphysical entity such as group minds. According to Searle, such entity is a "dreadful metaphysical excrescence" and any attempts aimed at its explanations are "at best mysterious and at worst incoherent".[32] Like Searle's view, one of Bratman's motivations for subscribing to individualism is his adherence to the opinion that shared intentions is not an attitude in the minds of some super-agent. He rejects any metaphysical entity such as a group minds to which the collective intentional states could be ascribed. Such an entity, according to him, is hard to establish. He says that—"there is no single mind which is the fusion of your mind and mine".[33]

However, this individualistic construal is not free from problems. Bernhard Schmid, for example, holds that Searle paradoxically tries to break away from the traditionally accepted view regarding individualism (by rejecting the summative account) but finally endorses other form of individualism to avoid group minds (when he upholds methodological individualism and holds that all intentionality is in individuals minds alone).[34] He says that Searle attempts to provide an account of collective intentions "without letting any genuine collectivity enter the scene".[35]In Searle's account, the collective intentions is nothing more than a mere by-product of the 'we-intentionality' which 'individuals' have. So, the whole question of the relation between the individual and society is wrongly put.

In a similar vein, Bratman's subscription to individualism paves the way for some important questions such as—how can the non-summative account of Bratman be undersood as 'reductive in spirit'?[36]Does the interlocking web that Bratman talks about in his explanation of collective intentions is a new thing altogether or can it be ultimately traced back to the constituting individuals and their relevant attitudes? If it is an altogether new thing, how does his account remain reductive and if it is not new and can ultimately be traced back to participating individuals, how can it be regarded as non-summative? His attempt to formulate collective intentions on the basis of external relationality between individual attitudes makes it difficult to be regarded as reductive (and also individualistic in the strict sense).

So, it appears that the accounts of both Searle and Bratman could not provide a satisfactory answer to the question of "what is it to intend something together". The unifying element, the togetherness among the intentions of the individual participants, appears to be quite weak. Many thinkers are of the view that to avoid any such entity as group minds, Searle and Bratman gives an analysis of collective intentions that remain superficial.[37] Their accounts fail to capture the core of collectivity fully. This missing cohesiveness can be located in Gilbert's explanation of collective intentions.

2. *There could be a position that somehow attempts to avoid the issue of group minds by resorting to the significance of the conglomeration of individual intentional states.*

Toumela's take on we-intentions could be regarded as something which hold this position philosophically. In some of his landmark books and papers, Toumela accepts the notion of group agency and group minds from a metaphorical point of view.[38]He upholds a view that takes the notion of extrinsically intentional group agent to be very useful from a functional point of view.[39] He uses the 'group agent' as a conceptual tool to present his 'we-mode approach' to collective intentionality.[40]

Groups, in Toumela's view, can never be persons in the flesh and blood sense (this also includes phenomenal experiences). They, in fact, are entities that have some functional features similar to fully intentional human agents. This implies that groups could be metaphorically construed as thinking, wanting, and possessing normative responsibilities. The individual agent is not the primary actor but a representative acting on behalf of the group. So, in Toumela's analysis, a group is the intentional but not the ontological subject of actions and attributes that are ascribed to it. They can be regarded as agents with minds from a conceptual point of view to facilitate our understanding and explanation of we-intentions as opposed to I-intentions.

In a similar vein as Toumela, Gilbert also does not discuss any such thing as group minds but her idea of "plural subject" comes quite close. The ascription of intentional states to groups as a whole is not metaphorical rather she ropes in a normative factor to account for the coordination Her account equips us with an additional tool that may help us explain the element of cohesiveness and normativity which could not be traced in the earlier individualistic accounts.

3. *There could be a third alternative that might suggest that collective intentions literally exist in the 'minds' of the group***.**

An analysis of the above positions prompts us to raise one pertinent question — can there be any third point of view, a view that clearly endorses 'group minds'? Can there be an account that upholds the ontological existence of groups as a whole apart from the constituting individuals? If that is the case what would such an accountbe like? Can it be said to fare better than the above-stated views? How would such an account tackle the conditions that led to the vehement denouncement of group minds? It is true that such an account is not difficult to conceive but has been deliberately avoided or overlooked by the philosophers of minds and action. In simple words, the group mind thesis implies that a group as a whole can have certain cognitive properties that none of its members has. It upholds the view that an integration of individuals constitute an intentional subject displaying intentional states such as desires, beliefs, intentions and judgments, and performing the actions which such intentional states rationalize. Philosopher such as Philip Pettit holds that groups exhibit the degree of coherence and constancy that is expected of any intentional subject.[41]A collective is an integration of individuals and not a casual aggregate. It has a shared purpose and it is in

pursuit of that purpose only that it forms judgments and intentions. When a group could be attributed mind in this way, it facilitates the ascription of obligations, entitlements, and responsibility in cases of collective actions. It enables the ascertainment of duties and rights of the group as a whole which is not reducible to any particular member comprising the group. It strengthens the sense of commitment among members and helps in attributing responsibility in the event of the breach of that commitment. The outright rejection or diversion makes the issue of group minds even more intriguing and philosophically significant. For its espousal or rejection, it has to be discussed for a fuller understanding of any collective phenomena.

Conclusion

It is clear from the above discussion that any discussion of a collective action has to be routed through collective intentions. However, philosophers are not much united on the issue as to how these collective intentions have to be understood. The individualists maintain that the ultimate repositories of the collective intentional states are the individual members of the respective groups. Though the content and the form of such intentions might be different from the intentions which the inmdividuals might have in cases of individual actions. I have argued that due to a presupposed denial of a superminds or group minds, the individualists fall short of being able to capture the collectivistic essence of collective intentions. Their vehement disapproval of such a thesis made it difficult for them to maintain a parallel between their versions of individualism and non-summativism and reductivism (in case of Bratman). On the one hand, are individualists like Searle and Bratman, who grapple with various criticisms for avoiding the spectre of group minds. On the other hand is Toumela, who could not overlook the explanatory strength of group minds and group agency and ultimately conceded to a milder version of the group mind. Avoiding any extreme claims (accepting the literal formation of a group minds), he is still able to recognise the expounding advantage of the thesis of the group minds. Gilbert's account goes a step further to make room for the normative responsibility. Her explanation certainly has an edge over the other accounts that ignore the normative conditions or consider it too strict a condition to incorporate in their schema. I have, therefore, upheld the view here that an acceptance of a group mind is a necessary precondition if one has to provide a robust and sound explanation of collective intentions as well as collective actions. The philosophical advantages of such an acceptance might range from a better understanding of the social phenomena to a better ascription of responsibility in cases of group actions.

Notes

[1] I am using the terms collectives and groups interchangeably.

[2] Schweikard, David P. and Hans Bernhard Schmid, " Collective In tentionality", The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/enteries/collective-intentionality/>

[3] Ibid.

[4] Different factors are accepted by different philosophers. However, in this paper, I have not dealt with these factors in detail.

[5] It seems that in view of the phenomena at issue here it was first coined by John Searle in his 1990 paper "Collective Intentions and Actions".

[6] Tollefsen, http://www.iep.utm.edu/coll-int/.

[7] Toumela 2013.

[8] The responsibility factor would not be dealt with in the present paper.

[9] Gilbert 1989.

[10] Quinton 1975.

[11] Some non-summative accounts shall be discussed in the next section.

[12] Tollefsen, http://www.iep.utm.edu/coll-int/.

[13] It is important to note that here collective actions, joint actions, and social actions are used interchangeably. He is primarily talking of joint intentions pertaining to smaller groups. Nevertheless, for the present purpose they may be taken to be collective intentions.

[14] Toumela and Miller1 988, 370; Toumela1989,175.

[15] Toumela and Miller 1988, 370.

[16] Ibid., 370-371

[17] Tuomela and Miller 1988, 375; Tuomela1991, 252; Tuomela 2005, 340–41.

[18] Tuomela and Miller 1988, 371.

[19] It holds that collective intentions cannot just be reduced to a mere summation of individual intentions. We cannot get collective intentions by aggregating several intentional states of individuals. This is also called the irreducibility thesis since it upholds the non-reducibility of collective intentions to individual intentions.

[20] We-intentions and I-intentions are the linguistic expression for collective intentions and individual intentions respectively.

[21] Searle 1990 a , 404.

[22] For the present purpose both the terms will be used interchangeably.

[23] Bratman 1993, 97.

[24] Ibid., 99.

[25] Ibid., 110.

[26] Ibid., 101.

[27] Ibid., 106.

[28] Gilbert 1989; Gilbert 1990.

[29] Gilbert 1990, 183.

[30] Gilbert 1996, 268.

[31] Even those philosophers who accept the notion of group minds in one way or the other shy away from considering them as persons analogous to individual human persons.

[32] Searle 1990 a, 407.

[33] Bratman 1993, 98.

[34] Schmid 2003.

[35] Ibid., 203.

[36] Bratman 1993, 105.

[37] Schmid 2003, 206.

[38] Tuomela 2007; Toumela 2013.

[39] Extrinsic intentionality of Group Agents mean that the group members form the group minds collective attitudes (wants, intentions, beliefs), by their collective acceptance or some related group-internal process or mechanism.

[40] The discussion of the group minds, according to Toumela, has started in ancient Greece and Rome. It has been prevalent in myths, in the history and philosophy of law and political philosophy and theory.

[40] Pettit 2013

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Political Correctness: A Corridor of Uncertainty or Necessity?

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Abstract

My contention in this paper is to draw attention to certain ambiguities and paradoxes in the concept of political correctness and address its significance in the contemporary society. In order to find its significance, it is crucial to evaluate Political Correctness (PC) in the linguistic, cultural, social and political backgrounds. We will see that the philosophical aspects of PC unearth various sorts of dilemma, making it a corridor of uncertainty. Basically, it promotes liberalism but the conundrum lies in being truly liberal in order to give space to other voices and theories, which is never an easy task. The ideological and political anxieties in contemporary times have been reflected in this paper also. Even if the debates on PC never reach a firm conclusion as anti-PCers argue for the weaknesses of political correctness, nevertheless, we can use political correctness as a tool to protect and inculcate certain human values and set a borderline on passing our opinions on sensitive matters so that these do not hurt others. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of taking double standard in being politically correct; but leaving that aside, PC could still be a viable medium to preserve our liberal attitude in certain respects.

Keywords : *Political Correctness; Liberalism; Enlightenment; Euphemism; Speech-acts; Language.*

Introduction

In an era when opinions are often attacked without understanding its implications, beliefs are satiated without being justified, and knowledge has slowly been shifted to information, 'Political Correctness' (PC) has evolved as a movement as well as a phenomenon in our social and cultural milieu. According to the Oxford Dictionary of New Words, PC is 'conformity to a body of liberal or radical opinion on social matters, characterised by the advocacy of approved views and the rejection of language and behaviour considered discriminatory or offensive' (Knowles and Elliott, 1997). My contention in this paper is to draw attention to certain ambiguities and paradoxes in the concept of political correctness and address its significance in the contemporary society. This would necessarily involve the movements that have taken place as well as the linguistic, moral and political concerns associated with the idea of political correctness.

Geoffrey Hughes remarks, "*Political correctness* became part of the modern lexicon and, many would say, part of the modern mind-set, as a consequence of the wide-ranging public debate which started on campuses in the United States from the late 1980s. Since nearly 50 percent of Americans go to college, the impact of the controversy was widespread. It was out of this ferment that most of the new vocabulary was generated or became current" (Hughes, 2010, p. 3). It is irrefutable that language has played a key role in the development of this concept. Since the 1980s and 1990s the PC movement has spread in the universities, colleges, cultures, political spheres as well as the artists. Euphemism is regarded as the main tool of political correctness (Halmari, 2011). So, one could sense a play of language in this notion. This is evident in Geoffrey Hughes since he is concerned with the semantic engineering of political correctness where a new world of words form a new semantic environment. Some of such words are 'lookism', 'sex worker', 'other', 'multicultural', 'herstory', 'differently abled', 'issue' etc. Hughes admits that these are not entirely new words but he is inspired by George Orwell in deploying such vocabularies (Hughes, 2010, p. 5).

PC is often related with the notion of multiculturalism, even it is accused that it is a failed model of multiculturalism. PC has obvious deficiencies as well. It talks about discrimination and the PCers argue against this, but often itself fall prey to the traps of discrimination and ideological biases, and become the oppressors themselves. According to Valeri Lichev and Miroslava Hristoskova, "One of the most serious problems of politically correct speech is its inability to express the uniqueness of human existence—a problem that French poststructuralists already came upon in the 1960s. An alternative solution to this problem can be sought, not by inventing non-discriminatory vocabulary, but rather, by generating new types of non-discriminatory discourses, including artistic ones" (Lichev & Hristoskova, 2017, p. 2). So there are impediments associated with PC, but still it has grown up as a movement in some Western parts of the globe, esp. in

universities, colleges and across the cultures. Gradually it has become a viable area of discussion in the contemporary political philosophy.

Political Correctness and Language

The concept of political correctness is entangled with the use of language. The way someone uses language to be politically correct could seem to others as a conscious attempt to play with language. The language that is used to define one's position requires some criteria to be fulfilled. There is a possibility to use a persuasive language to deny that I am being politically correct. It could be some emotive function of language; for example, 'spinster' is comparatively a better term than calling someone an 'unmarried old woman'. Depending on the use or functionality of language, the mode of discourse changes its nature. Some words can have more force than others, while some may add new texture to the words or phrases hitherto used. Sometimes political correctness seems a taboo, sometimes it becomes a necessity. New vocabularies also could change the dynamics in and around the notion of political correctness. We can also claim that there are different speech-acts when one wants to be politically correct or when he fails to be so. The illocutions of the speech could be the junctures in this respect. But we should not mix them with the use of language. Austin's theory of speech-acts speaks about the intended or unintended effects produced by the illocutionary speech-acts (Austin, 1962, p. 105). The variation in delivering a sentence or words brings in certain effects in a hearer. Therein lies the perlocutionary act. Austin says, "the perlocutionary act may include what in a way are consequences, as when we say 'By doing *x* I was doing *y*': we do bring in a greater or less stretch of 'consequences' always, some of which may be 'unintentional'" (Austin, 1962, p. 106). Being politically correct may invite one to alter the application in language, use rhetoric on occasions or act in a certain way while using some utterances. In addition, the speaker needs to be cautious in terms of application of words if he intends to be politically correct. If there is a concern of producing effects, then the choice of words becomes a necessity. Otherwise, for many, political correctness is a taboo or negativity. Even there is a possibility to use a persuasive language to deny that I am being politically correct. Therefore, everything is not tangible when the notion of political correctness is discussed beyond the purview of its linguistic usage.

The problem occurs when language is used without being sensitive for the meaning, and misused or ill-used that result to a disaster. In the political spheres where language is used in such a way then the past of the people, their social strata are affected to a great extent. "Language is a labyrinth of paths", according to Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 1958, § 203). Now someone approaches from one side knows his way, someone who aproaches from another side does not know the way about. To contextualize this, we may say that the use of language could be so corrupt or destructive that it

could leave a huge impact on the psyche of the inviduals on the receiving end. The bifurcation of truth, with the help of metaphors could create a rage among a group of people, and their identity, ethnicities could also face a severe outcome. So the moral and cultural aspects, when we are dealing with the concepts of being politically correct or politically wrong become a crucial juncture. The ramification of the speech acts should be taken into consideration if we want to reevaluate the linguistic domain of political correctness, as the linguistic usage is essential in PC. The perlocutionary force could make a politically correct speech successful, if it constitutes the required expression that could motivate the hearer. The problem is that in the case of hierarchy of powers, people may use politically correct speech for their own benefit. Due to this the idea of PC often faces criticism. Without being equipped with 'linguistic tact' and the delay associated regarding this in the PC movement throughout the world, PC has failed to realize the dignity and rights of the people (Lichev & Hristoskova, 2017, p. 4). Speech acts could help it out if the concerned people engage in intercultural dialogue across different nations and races with an aim to clear the offensive usage of language describing different groups. On a brighter note, there are instances of better expressions of language to describe the rights of particular group of people, and that is a positive contribution of PC. For example, 'invalid' has been replaced by 'handicapped', later on with even better expression like 'differently abled'.

If we trace back the issue of PC with its linguistic and cultural domain, the Wittgensteinian notion of form of life could give us an idea as to address why there is cultural and linguistic negotiations associated with being poilitically correct. Wittgenstein remarks that if we imagine language game we must also imagine a form of life. Language cannot be used in isolation, and therefore, the use or misuse of language is also necessarily tied with how we use apply language which is entangled with culture. The application of Wittgensteinian idea could be manifested in our understanding of the language of the different types of minority groups, e.g. autistic persons, homosexuals, small ethnic and marginalized groups, migrants etc. Unless and until we understand the different languages of different forms of life or ways of living, there will always be a void space between the people who in spite of being in different altitudes of life are actually bound to encounter one another, not to confront but to live in harmony. Otherwise, there is a possibility of language being corrupted in terms of use and as a result the powerful will oppress the weaker sections of the society. That is a threat that the supporters of PC cannot ignore as far as its linguistic, cultural and political dimensions are concerned. As some terms and phrases being politically correct are signs of respect towards the oppressed, some could be disheartening as well reflecting the manipulated use of certain terms, and truth being submerged into the hands of powerful ones. That again could remind us how Wittgenstein treats our struggle with language in his book *Culture and Value*, why there is a need to erect sign posts in order to warn about the wrong turnings. Someone who wants to be politically correct

has also to remember that he should use language carefully so that it does not create unnecessary problems for others. There is a subtle variation of language in different contexts, with the application of rules accordingly, and a cunning approach may invariably lead a person towards repressing the dissenting voices. So, wrong turnings if overlooked, could become dangerous for the concerned participants in the discourse. Language is such a delicate medium, and at the same time it is a devastatingly powerful medium that could make everyone vulnerable.

Still, that is not the end of the story – as corruption in terms of linguistic usage is quite evident as far as the political domain is concerned, where power is a key factor. The corruption cannot be ascribed only to the domain of politics. Language gets corrupted as well which needs to be addressed when the political discourses are taken into consideration. According to Caleb Thompson, "In a general way, political language aims to guide people's perceptions of conditions and events in a way that is favourable to the interests of a politician and his party, interests which may or may not be consistent with the interest of his listeners… the accuracy of language is abandoned in favour of its effect; truth is subordinated to ambition" (Thompson, 1992, p. 19). The manipulation of language could be made in such a way that the listener would be victimized by the political leaders without even knowing about it. The oratory skill of the leader could make the voices of his followers or listeners submerged. Here two questions arise: How to become 'correct'? And how does it configure with being 'political'? One major problem is the conflict between politics and morality. Being morally correct and being politically correct are two different propositions altogether. Languages are used to cater the malfunctioning of the interest of human beings who are subordinated to the game-plan of the politicians. Thompson puts it very fittingly, "Ordinarily the public figure who masks his own interests as the interests of others is called corrupt. This abuse of language, this disregard for the meaning of words, can be usefully called the *corruption of language*" (Thompson, 1992, p. 21). The policy of turning individuals into the means of attaining certain desired result ruins the public life at large. So, it is always a challenge for the individual to sustain his own voices, at the same time be the active part of the programmes and projects of the state.

PC has raised a complex cultural negotiation between free expression and diplomatic attitude. The cautiousness regarding use of phrases or words that purport to keep the social equilibrium gets importance. For example, it is better to use the phrase 'differently abled' than using 'disabled'; 'homemaker' is better than calling a woman 'housewife' who is not working outside her home. Even we can perceive 'Thanks for not smoking' written in places rather than 'Do not smoke'. The tendency is to be euphemist in these respects if one alleges so. It is a 'people first' movement or proposal that also started taking place in the early 1990s (Halmari, 2011). This is a result of linguistic relativism which supports the view that there is no fixing in language, and

also a protection of the sentiments of the concerned people. Even the feminists argue that in writing a book or an article, or in any narrative the preference is always given on 'his' instead of 'her' when something is described about an individual. So the hitches are there which also act as temptation to establish political correctness as a phenomenon. Here, I am more interested in observing the play with the linguistic idioms or phrases rather than the PC movement. PC is more of a cloud of linguistic phrases and idioms. The examples of politically correct phrase would be gender-independent terms like 'lawyer', 'doctor' instead of 'woman lawyer' or 'lady doctor'. In the contemporary society, this type of thinking is like a medicine and adds so much value.

Even then, being politically correct or politically wrong could be seen from subjective point of views. Those who oppose PC would say that a politically correct truth and a factual truth must be looked at separately. In fact, language when it is dominated by power makes political correctness a tool to repress the voices with dissent – becomes "intolerance disguised as tolerance". •i•ek treats PC as a "dangerous form of totalitarianism" (Lichev & Hristoskova, 2017, pp. 4-5). So, those who are politically wrong could be repressed by the politically correct ones who dominate them with the hegemonic structure of power, with subtle use of language in order to benefit their own causes.

The Uncertainties in Political Correctness: Philosophical Aspects

The problem with political correctness is that often we live in consensus that makes us believe in a certain world that is full of conviction which is not always the case. It may appear as convincing, but behind the scene it may be a 'bad faith'. The question is: how the consensus on something to be achieved? Disagreements could be sorted out on the basis of some shared values and goals, common interests. The issue is to observe whether it excludes some people outside of community, those who do not conform to the consensus. Consensus needs to be achieved by proper hermeneutical approach, rather than by any exclusive policy. There is a phobia in the government and the non-government authorities on new ideas emerging from difference of opinions. They tend to believe that these ideas would actually create an obstacle to the policy-making. This often provokes them taking some measures to stop the emergence of new ideas. In this respect, the persuasion to create an atmosphere where everyone would look for a homogeneous goal is a success of political correctness.

One may follow an ideology without questioning its moral implication. That puts the followers in a crisis without being recognized as such, since everyone associated with the ideology is either so much convinced about this or fear to question its implication. The same could be said about some religious beliefs and customs as well. The hermeneutic challenge lies in accepting the norms of ideology, religious beliefs and taking up the task of interpreting those. The interpretations also may not be

comprehensible enough, yet their importance cannot be denied due to its ability to help the understanding of the ideology or religious beliefs. Paul Ricoeur addresses the possible relation between the canonical authority and various forms of political repression as "hermeneutics of suspicion" (Scanlon, 1995, p. 11). However, this hermeneutics of suspicion does not treat the canon as a timeless truth, rather as a live force working constantly in shaping our thinking. Scanlon writes, "One interrogates canonical authority so rigorously not to obliterate it, but rather to determine in as precise and direct a manner as possible what it has to offer us at this moment in history" (Scanlon, 1995, p. 13). In the college-university campuses of US the situation is somewhat of a different level; here personal freedom is alleged to create a lot of problem as evident by the behaviours of some notoriously volatile adolescents. Under the veil of political correctness often the sex codes are used prescribing "the necessity for explicit consent at every step of sexual encounter" (Fox-Genovese, 1995, p. 10). Therefore, one can argue, political correctness has pros as well as cons.

There could be other conundrums with the concept of political correctness. According to Geoffrey Hughes, "From its first manifestations in America, political correctness has had a double agenda, being a combination of freedom and constraint. The "political" aspect involved opening up new cultural horizons, but "correctness" brought conformity in accepting new agendas, new limits on freedom of expression, and a general avoidance of certain controversial topics" (Hughes, 2010, p. 284). The semantics of political correctness has to be observed in the light of the attitude of the speaker and the acceptability or unacceptability of the choice of words. Another crucial feature of political correctness which has a positive effect on the society is the replacement of cultural elitism by relativism (Hughes, 2010, p. 285). It has become more and more contextual and less absolute. The content of a speech gets lesser importance, instead it is the speaker and when he said something gets more spotlight (Hughes, 2010, p. 286). It has adverse effects as well. Hughes cites the example of Barack Obama in this regard. He says, "Even when Barack Obama was elected President of the United States, the primary emphasis was on his color and race (as it had been during the campaign), less on his outstanding abilities as an orator, charismatic politician, strategist, and mobilizer of the electorate, all of which made him a deserving victor" (Hughes, 2010, p. 288).

The tradition of believing in a set of ideals is something that is in need of criticism, though criticism is not always received in an open-minded way. Matthew Arnold, A noted Victorian critic in his essay "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time" defines criticism as "a disinterested endeavor to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world." According to him the English society is not so open to other traditions (Arnold, 1865). There is a Eurocentric mentality which debars it from knowing the good tenets of other societies. Arnold was looking for a society that is

open-minded, able to face criticism and inclusive in nature. Criticism is an ongoing process, a continuous examining and re-examining of traditional beliefs. Perhaps, in this respect the role of intercultural philosophy has to be recognized, as it paves way for a liberal attitude towards knowing and interpreting different cultures, philosophies, thoughts and ideologies across the continents. Mere reception of traditional ideas is not criticism; and in that sense, criticism is also not immune from criticism (*Cf.* Fox-Genovese & Scanlon, 1995, p. 13). Arnold's concern was focused on the English national character – on one side there is industrial capitalism, on the other English patriotism. The strategy we can adopt from Arnold is that it is not always necessary to be opponent to any idea or to take any side necessarily; one may take an apolitical stance as well, and still add value to the society by his critical insight and inclusive practices. Political correctness involves a moral dilemma of being either an absolutist or relativist. Either there is objective moral good seeking a common platform for justice and equality, or some specific perspectives are there based on the community's desires and interests. Even there could be an orthodox mindset in the proponents of liberalism who deny any sort of objective truth, or in the Enlightenment theories which advocate scientific rationalism. PC promotes liberalism, but that also has to give space for other doctrines to be heard in order to protect liberalism itself. At times, both sides could be politically correct to protect their versions of liberal truth-claims and bring PC to a circular and closed dispute (Dzenis & Faria, 2020). Political correctness is a home of cultural, ethnological, linguistic diversity on one side, and the craving for commonality on the other. There is a sense of ambivalence with this concept as it is always standing on the corridor of uncertainty.

Truth and political correctness have a peculiar relationship that it is sometimes very difficult to comprehend. Very often the bifurcation of truth leads one to become politically correct. The challenge before us is to determine whether someone is 'correct, or 'politically correct'. Being correct implies one's truthfulness, but the same cannot be said about a politically correct person. Political correctness can be said to have influenced a lot across the cultures, political spheres, universities, college campuses, artistic domains etc. In the latter half of 1980s and early half of 1990s the movement took off. As far as the significance of 'truth' is concerned, 'truth' is not taken in an objective sense according to the post-modern thinkers. Therefore, it is important to recognize epistemic relativism in the debate on PC. One cannot rely on a single truth, even in the academic scenario it is undeniable. According to Dzenis and Faria, "Competing hypotheses within academia are the standard, but accepting no common standard of evaluation is likely to lead to parallel worlds of knowledge. Such worlds cannot assess one another without potential accusations of illegitimate authoritarianism" (Dzenis & Faria, 2020, p. 103). The political correctness remains in such ways in the academia. Another factor is that truth depends on perspective, as the perspectives of a heterosexual and a homosexual

are different and no can can claim that his truth is more pure than the other. Truth-claims is connected to a great extent to identity (Dzenis & Faria, 2020, p. 103).

If we look at PC from an epistemological perspective, we may find it hard to establish its philosophical justification. The problem with a PCer or supporter of political correctness is that they do not accept any truth, as they think everything is relative to a particular context. Contextualism takes them to a position where they are bound to close their eyes to any possibility of truth and adopt a dogmatic standpoint. They have somewhat a postmodern attitude in this regard since the PCer is against any sort of absoluteness. In this regard, they are even more radical than a follower of philosophical skepticism as ignorance empowers them to embrace the dogmatism according to which there is no truth. According to Francis J. Beckwith, "By dogmatically asserting that there is no truth, the naive student and the PC advocate become closed-minded to the possibility of knowing the truth if in fact it does exist. This is why the PCer's view of epistemological relativism differs significantly from classical philosophical skepticism and is much closer to solipsism. The skeptics did not deny that truth existed, but rather, one could not be sure when and if one had the truth or at least one was incapable of providing a rational justification for it" (Beckwith, 1994, p. 335). Beckwith also observes that PCers tend to defend value relativism to justify their position that there is no objective moral principle. But this happens due to the selfishness of the people who want to continue enjoying the political power, irrespective of their awareness with the objective moral principles (Beckwith, 1994, p. 337). Both these kinds of relativism fail to provide justification for political correctness, and as a result, according to Beckwith, "the philosophical basis for political correctness collapses" (Beckwith, 1994, p. 338).

When we attempt to evaluate the notion of political correctness from a philosophical point of view, we should take into account that a politically correct person may be very good at rhetoric and diplomacy as these qualities are essential for him. But on the other, whether he is morally correct that will depend on his moral decision making, his actions and moral dispositions. Even someone who is politically wrong, due to his lack of rhetoric skill and diplomatic ability may be morally right if he understands his moral duties, displays virtues through his actions and moral dispositions. A PC supporter would go for value relativism, even then his task will be to uphold the moral values. On the other hand, certain moral values are integral to human life irrespective of caste, creed, gender, country, social and political interventions. Therefore, a PCer cannot ignore the moral characteristic of human beings, and cannot just be euphemistic in nature to preserve his political correctness. If that happens, then being politically correct or politically wrong would make no sense in human life, and neither would have any philosophical justification.

Political Correctness and the Existing Contemporary Anxieties

Suppression of voice is also performed in the name of political correctness. Suppression of leftist critique might be termed as 'ideological anxiety'. Same could be

applied to fascist ideology, though the application of suppressing the opponent voices may differ. But the collapse of the ideological systems has caused the people to live with doubt creeping into their minds, and they are in need of new ideological certainties (Ashbolt, 1994, p. 40). Therein lies the paradox of political correctness. Basically, one can argue that PC is nothing but the criticism of those who dissent. In US, the PC critics want to overturn the "commonly accepted liberal democratic pluralism" (Ashbolt, 1994, p. 41). The PC-critiques Roger Kimball and Dinesh D'Souza "want to consolidate a neo-conservative agenda at the very time when agendas and ideologies are in disarray" (*Cf.* Ashbolt, 1994, p. 41). Although the issue of PC started mainly in US, we can observe that it stems to our vicinity also. If we avoid or fear to put forward the kind of questions or criticism we need to pose on certain governmental decisions or political framework, then perhaps being politically correct would be the best option for us; but this safe distance will once paralyze the progress of the society.

Politicization of education is a big problem in the contemporary society and in most part of the world. The problem occurs when we fail to keep a distance from any belief. The onslaught on the academics in some developing countries is an increasing phenomenon and it is taking a toll of the entire society. Even some first-world countries are known to have suffered a lot. The attack is on 'knowledge' which the universities need to foster. It is a time to fight the paranoids to save the universities, esp. the humanities in order to preserve 'critical thinking' which is a crucial factor to analyze the entire situation and to address new ways to disseminate knowledge in the increasingly diverse and necessarily conflicted academic communities. Universities are the centers of inquiry and critical reflection, and these are at stake (Scott, 1991, pp. 30-32). Therefore, if we do not protect the universities, and disciplines like humanities, literature, social sciences etc. then a time will come when knowledge will become a commodity only and subjects will be treated in terms of their market values. We can already feel the anxiety nonetheless, but still we have to fight to prevent further damage and restore the glory of the education system.

Joan W. Scott (1991, p. 43) remarks, "within the universities, the humanities in particular offer the possibility of thinking about diversity and community in new ways." The tendency is to look for a common endeavour in everything which creates an impediment for multiculturalism. However, one cannot deny that the worship of fake secularism is also a disease like strong nationalism, but hardly any political party is immune to this disease. Whatsoever, being apolitical cannot be termed as being politically unconscious. The awareness to draw attention to the nuances of change in every sector of politics, be it environment politics or bio-politics, requires an astute understanding of our historical, social and cultural transformation.

PC is a product of linguistic and cultural turn in the human civilization. Politicization of culture and language is evident in the contemporary times – hardly anyone can get rid of this. So, when we are concerned with politicization of education we should not overlook the fact that politicization has entered to every sector of society, not only education. As it includes the recognition of identities, ethnic representations and power, PC is invariably looking for a broader space in the political philosophy. Some think that it is associated with postmodernism, as in the sixties Foucault, Barthes etc. observed that there is a direct relation between language and power; it has its linkage with political correctness as well (Lichev & Hristoskova, 2017, p. 4). Later on in the eighties and nineties it emerged as a phenomenon in the US, esp. in the academic domain and also in some other public domains. PC is very much related with the politics of representations, values and identities. The cultural turn associated with these aspects has made PC a 'cultural politics' in the contemporary era (Fairclough, 2003). This sort of politics is entangled with the society at first, then gradually it is incorporated into philosophy and as a social theory.

The cultural turn has taken place in the form of broadcasting through television and plays its part in our economic, social and family life. Then culture and discourse have become influential in economic production and consumption. As a result, knowledge, skill, aptitudes, attitudes etc. of employees have become essential commodities in the business and industrial sectors, the discourse of knowledge-based economy has emerged as one of the key components of modern civilization (Fairclough, 2003, p. 19). Why is it a factor in the debate on political correctness? The answer is, the cultural politics leaves a scope for labelling particular sector of customers or consumers in accordance with the representations and identities that often suit the more powerful stakeholders. PC then becomes a master tool to accord this sort of politics of recognition. Norman Fairclough (2003, p. 21) remarks, "It is worth considering why critics of 'PC' readily say that it is 'PC' to suggest that adult females should be referred to as 'women' and not 'girls', but do not see it as 'PC' when 'bank accounts' are re-labelled as 'financial products'. This re-labelling is certainly prescriptive for bank employees, and imposed on customers, and in that sense has to do with what is 'correct'. But I imagine it is not generally seen as 'political'." What is important to note in this matter is that discourses play a pivotal role in manipulating the representations of different social strata. The cultural shift in the politics of representation and identity has evolved the notion of political correctness to new dimensions of political and social philosophy.

Conclusion

Question remains: What to do with political correctness? The good thing is that it makes us refraining from using words like 'nigger', and promotes respect towards other human beings. So, there is a conscious attempt to uphold PC, about admitting the

idea of "people first" as discussed earlier. Again, it is about the play of language, using different language-games which may either collapse a particular ideology as a postmodernist could argue, or about raising new voices in the society – voices of subaltern or those who have been dominated since ages. So, the discourses bring new light as far as the opening up of emerging voices is concerned; and this positive effect of the discourses on political correctness has to be upheld irrespective of supporting or opposing PC.

Regarding the negative aspect, the possibility of taking double standard cannot be ignored either. This is one of the biggest problems with political correctness. The PC critics would then want to set a limit to politically correct languages and see the outcome. The language could be so camouflaging if we perceive the society in a prejudiced way. Political correctness is not a bad tool if it helps us to inculcate humanity and fairness. The prerogative rests on us to keep the balance between freedom of expression and exercise of respecting the opinion of others. Therefore, I would conclude that political correctness, in spite of having its corridor of uncertainty, has much significance as far as the contemporary social and political life is concerned. May be it is due to our indulgence on expressing our opinions in a more vociferous way nowadays through social media, but PC always keeps reminding us that there is a borderline which is better to respect when passing opinions on matters which are sensitive in nature.

It should also be taken into consideration that political correctness is a reaction to the politics of recognition, identity and culture. The understanding of the discourses on PC requires an astute understanding of the linguistic and cultural turn in the latter half of twentieth century. The fragmentation of society in different dimensions, the intervention of print, electronic and now social media contribute a great extent to the discourses on PC. I have tried to illustrate PC as a movement in different milieus, and also attempted to show the play of language with regard to being politically correct or wrong. However, there is always a space for moral assessment of PC. Also, a large section of society and its members do not bother about being politically correct and raise their opinion on critical matters. That does not mean that they are morally culpable, as being politically correct does not necessarily presuppose to be morally right. Nevertheless, the moral aspect should not be ignored since PC could very cleverly be applied to suppress the voice of the subaltern and various minority groups. However, in the sociolinguistics PC could be seen as a new domain of social engineering, and the followers of PC need to carefully analyze its status in the neo-liberal global structure of economy and politics. Otherwise, the critics of PC will continue to allege that the proponents of PC uphold linguistic and cultural discrimination with their vocabularies. The 'othering' of the marginalized people is already there in the society, and mere euphemism in being politically correct is not enough to annihilate the othering and distancing of the marginalized, oppressed, poorer sections of the society. If that is not

properly addressed and ratified, being politically correct or politically wrong will not have any constructive impact on the society irrespective of the presence of PC through media, governmental and non-governmental spectrum. Therefore, the debate on political correctness cannot escape the corridors of uncertainty since it is quite a delicate issue having its pros and cons as far as its social implication in concerned.

Note

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Minimal Sense of Self and "Free Will": An Ontological Inquiry

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Abstract

This paper attempts to explicate the notion of free will in its connection with a minimal sense of self, i.e.self-awareness from a first-person perspective. This first-person perspective demonstrates 'what is it like to have an experience', this intentional quality shows the 'mineness' in every instance of experience which consequently leaves a sense of self. The proposed promise demands to make it free from a fixed structure in this notion of the minimal sense of self which seems so when one takes first personal perspective seriously. To show how it seems determinate the paper, by taking a clue from Dennett's arguments against free will, intends to explicate a fixed structure by magnifying the **first-person perspective.** Further, it establishes the determinacy, then, by provoking Shaun Gallagher's distinction between 'sense of agent' and 'sense of ownership' I intend to create fragility in that fixed structure where one can find the clue of 'free will'. And this clue gets its support from Sartre's notion of the reflective self which finds its ultimate basis in the minimal sense of self. In this paper, to demonstrate the free will, I will develop the notion of reflective self to just delineate the fragility more where an agent can "choose otherwise" and, thus, enjoys free will.

Keywords : *Self, Minimal Sense of Self, Ontology, Sense, Free Will, Intentionality*

Introduction

Philosophers have always pondered over the notion of self and how it interacts with oneself and others. In phenomenological tradition, where how things appear to us

is significant, the question of self and its appearance to oneself causes much complexity to the problem of self. In the contemporary debate on the notion of self, Dan Zahavi argued in favour of a minimal sense of self to untangle the mystery of self.

If we move from metaphysics to ethics, some philosophers[1] too, are concerned to see whether we have any free will or not, believing any notion of self. For them, it really does not matter what notion of self we believe in. For instance, in a country like India where we cherish the norms and principles of democracy, but at the same time, we too feel the other mechanisms in "manufacturing consents"[2] among people to support one person over another.One may question citizens being free in the complex Indian system. To discuss such issues, philosophers do not need to specify their preferred notion of self or to, first, settle the debate of self, and, then, discuss the free will among citizens.

Therefore, if anyone wishes to take up the Herculean task of settling the debates of self and then providing a clear answer of free will according to that notion, they need to inquire in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. It is quite clear why the inquiry needs to be done in metaphysics and ethics, but to see its epistemological shades, one requires to look at the notion of experience. The notion of "experience" is epistemically significant to understand the notion of self whether its minimal sense of self or the narrative self. However, the significant point to note here is that we intend to bridge the notion of self and free will which require the understanding of both the notions and epistemic discernment of the agent on a particular act.

However, the present paper seeks freewill in the minimal notion of sense, or say, to locate the free will in the prescribed structure of the minimal notion of self. Rather than looking at whether one will act freely in certain situations, we are seeking whether one is free in experiencing the otherwise if one believes in the minimal sense of self.

The present paper works on a condition, that is, one believes in the minimal sense of self. In order to show the seeds of free will, the objective of the paper demands to stretch the structure of the minimal sense of self. While we stretch the structure, we may feel the need for certain concepts and tools to refurbish the self to place the notion of free will in it. If the structure does not allow us to experience the otherwise, the possibility to act differently is a distant goal. Therefore, rather than knowing what the minimal sense of self is and how it experiences, the paper explicitly examines the structure of the minimal sense of self. Therefore, we call it an ontological inquiry, and not the epistemic one.

1. Minimal Notion of Self

Dan Zahavi concludes, in one of the chapters in the book, *Consciousness, and Self* that "there is a minimal sense of self present whenever there is self-awareness, self-awareness is there not only when I realize that *I* am perceiving a candle (and for that

matter, any object), but whenever I am acquainted[3] with an experience in *its* first-personal mode of givenness, that is, whenever there is something it is something like for me to have the experience[4] (Emphasis added)." One can put it in an argument in this form-

a) To say that I am acquainted with an experience is to say that *it is something like for me* to have the experience (the first personal perspective)

b) To say that *it is something like for me* to have the experience shows the *mine-ness* of the experience.

c) This '*mine-ness'* shows as an awareness *within* the experience itself where '*mine-ness'* is in central, thus, self-awareness. (an instance of a one-level account of consciousness)

d) Wherever there *is* self-awareness, there is at least a sense of self.

From 'c' and 'd' it follows-

There is a minimal sense of self.

In response to the Narrative self, passionately argued by Galen Strawson, Dan Zahavi argues for the minimal sense of self. Zahavi advocates that minimal sense of self points out to a notion of self that implicitly runs through with each of our experiences, i.e. eating popcorns, staring at mountains, reading Hegel, and even dreaming about becoming a philosopher. Not a single experience goes from consciousness without leaving a sense of mine-ness. To witness such mine-ness in each experience, we even don't need to reflect on the experiences. Therefore, Zahavi argues for the presence of pre-reflective self-awareness. For instance, a spectator in Sharjah witnessing the world cup final match does not need to reflect that it is her own experience. Hence, the self-awareness of such experiences comes with the experiences themselves.

The recent analysis implies, as Zahavi further delineates, the notion of pre-reflective self-awareness indicates a thin concept of self; a minimal sense of constant self being present in all the experiences. In this sense, pre-reflective self-awareness allows us not only to experience the objects but to witness the minimal sense of self as well. It leaves us with a sense of ownership of our experiences that implicitly signals to the minimal sense of self. Zahavi writes in order to explicate the mine-ness –

> Mineness refers to the distinct manner, or how of experiencing. It refers to the first-personal presence of all my experiential content; it refers to the fact that the experiences I am living through present themselves differently (but not necessarily better) to me than to anyone else. When I have experiences, I, so to speak, have them minely.[5]

Zahavi, in the first statement, says that mine-ness refers to how of experiencing rather than the content of experiences. Mine-ness, therefore, has nothing to do with whatever is out there, rather it shows the exclusive relation to the subject who experiences. If the subject owns a series of experiences, it signals to the first-person perspective that might be well interpreted in terms of a sense of self, which Zahavi calls minimal, that runs through all of our experiences. If a pre-reflective self-awareness travels through all of our experiences, and it generates a minimal sense of self, each subject is determined to call all the experiences, as Zahavi terms, minely. To explicate the significance of first-person perspective, Zahavi, further, explicates in one of his latest writings, *Self and Other: exploring subjectivity, empathy, and shame*,

> "Imagine two perfect twins, Mick and Mack, who are type identical when it comes to their physical and psychological properties. Currently, both of them are gazing at a white wall. In terms of content, the two streams of consciousness are type-identical. From a third-person perspective, there are no relevant qualitative differences between the two. But consider what happens the moment we leave the third-person perspective behind and instead adopt the first-person perspective. Let us assume that I am Mick, although my mental and physical characteristics continue to be type-identical with those of Mack, there would be, for me, a crucial difference between our respective tokens of experience, a difference that would prevent any kind of conflation. What might that difference consist of? It obviously has to do with difference of givenness."[6]

It clearly shows the relevance of the first-person perspective. Mick and Mack who, according to the thought experiment, are type identical. There is no doubt that the intentional matter whom they are directed to is the same, yet what makes their experiences different is the mine-ness of their experiences. If we look at Mick and Mack from a third-person perspective, it seems quite hard for us to differentiate their experiences. Unless and until we position Mick and Mack at the center of their experiences, allowing their first-person perspective to chip in, we would not be able to differentiate the experiences. Therefore, mine-ness or the minimal sense of self assists Mick and Mack to experience things differently despite having the same object outside.

However, how can we derive a sense of mine-ness from the first-person perspective? We have seen that we cannot exclude the subject of that experience from conscious experiences. It can be seen through Zahavi's statement – "the subject is not something that stands opposed to the stream of consciousness, but as, rather, immersed in conscious life; it is an integral part of its structure"[7]. It explicitly implies that all the experiences assume a subject with the minimal sense of self attached to the subject, as with an experiencer, one cannot think of any experience. Hence, just talking about the

experiences and adhering to the "mine-ness" of the experiences, directly implies the subjectivity of the experiences. We can conclude that mine-ness of the experiences in any stream of consciousness entails subjectivity and vice versa.

The present explication of Zahavi's position gives a clear picture of *what* this minimal self is. The next and the central task of the paper is to explicate the notion of free will in the seemingly rigid structure of the minimal self. The next move will be to show that free will demands an overcoming of any fixed structure where I am not allowed to do otherwise. In other words, I am free if and only if I can choose otherwise. If person A has a simple desire D and cannot have another desire D' instead of D, he is not free. Or If Person A is bound to have a simple desire D because of *the way* he is, he is *simply* not free. This shows two points very clearly-

1. There is a definite structure in which person A is bound to desire in that way and is thus not free.
2. Free will consists in breaking this definite structure and trying to find a way to desire otherwise.

2. The Fixed Structure in Minimal Sense of Self

One may ask how this definite structure comes to play a role in the notion of minimal self. There are two possible responses to this question, that is, either this minimal self has a definite structure and thus there is no free will[8], or it *seems* that there is a definite structure that must be curtained up in order to show free will. One can demonstrate this definite structure while magnifying the 'first personal perspective'. Let us, then, explicate the potential way in which one can possibly establish the determinate structure in the notion of minimal self by enlarging the first-person perspective, whether it is a valid explication that will be our next concern.

Let us accept the fact that I am presenting a paper *in* person and not through a virtual presence. Let us also assume that each member of the audience is not only listening to me carefully but I, as an embodied subject, am also presented to them as an object, and all of them are experiencing me by encountering my body. Even though there must be more than thirty people present, I will take only three people for my convenience to make this case more genuine. Let us say that these three people (Dristi, Shruti, and Sparsh) are watching me. All of them are watching me and, in this case, 'I' am a common object of experience to all of them, they have the same *intentional matter* in their experiences. So, what is it that makes their experience different if they have the same intentional matter? If all of them are allowed to explain their experience in the pre-reflective level, and they have the same intentional matter, therefore, their 'sense' of explanations would be the same. So, then, how can one say that the experience of Drishti is different from the experience of Shruti and Sparsh.

As Thomas Nagel famously argues that even if one explains the intentional matter well from all the perspectives, yet he lacks *what is to be* in that experience[9]. Despite this logical possibility of giving the same explanations by all three persons, yet they cannot explain the 'how of its givenness'. And *this* same 'how of its givenness'determine *what is to be* in the first place. This *what is to be* differentiates between two subject's experiences, and this shows that every person (in the above-imagined example, Dristi, Shruti, and Sparsh) has some unique perspective that *only* she can. This is known as the *First-person perspective***.** So, Dristi is experiencing me, and even thoughshe has the same intentional matter she differs in experience with others because she has her own *first-person perspective.*

however, to dig further in the same line of thinking, can she has a possibility to experience the same phenomena differently? To put it concretely, can Dristi experience me in a particularly given time t differently from *the way* she is experiencing? To put it differently, is Dristi free to experience me *otherwise*?

Let me excavate it further. The first person perspective has two sides: "what is the object like for the subject" and "what the experience of the object is for the subject." In other words, this experience contains two dimensions, one of the *sensing* and one of the *sensed*[10]. In this pattern, there is one thing common, that is, one is directed to the experience. The intentional matter may change but this directionality will not change. Let us stretch this experience out more. In every kind of experience, we seem to conclude only three things: an experiencer, experience itself, and object of experience. But to look closely at this seeming conclusion, two more things are implicitly there, so, one must make it explicit. They are – the *relation* between subject and experience and the relation between experience and object.

SUBJECT *R* EXPERIENCE……R……..OBJECT[11]

The latter is not important for me because it involves an intentional matter which by nature is meant to change. But again to approach the same question – is it possible for one to experience the same object otherwise? This question puts a condition, that is, the intentional matter is the same, and now what are the possibilities to see this object differently.

In phenomenological tradition, each consciousness is directed towards something. The moment we try to take out the directionality of the consciousness, we move to the end of the consciousness. Zahavi addresses the minimal sense of self in the pre-reflective self-awareness stage. This seems to imply that the minimal sense of self in phenomenological tradition is always directed towards something. The minimal sense of self has a structure that includes intentionality in it. It seems weexperience what we do, in any given situation, because of the way we are. In the above-mentioned diagram,

R (relation between subject and experience) represents the structure of minimal sense of self which indirectly refers to "the way we are." In this interpretation, we seem to have a fixed structure in the minimal sense of self that refrains us to experience otherwise.

We seem to witness that *R* is fixed, and in this sense,we are bound in our first-personal perspective. To put this in Daniel Dennett's words[12], we are experiencing the experience in *this* manner because of the way we are. Daniel Dennett argues against free will and his arguments can be put forward in the following way –

1. You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are.
2. To be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are — at least in certain crucial mental respects.
3. But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.

So you cannot be ultimately responsible for what you do.

Daniel Dennett clearly demonstrates the psychological structure of a subject/ experiencer that differentiates her from the other subjects. He argues that if a person has a fixed psychological structure and her actions and perspectives are determined by such structure, she cannot be claimed as a free subject. Zahavi, by all means – pre-reflective self-awareness, first-person perspective, mine-ness, and subjectivity, creates an ontological structure through which each subject experiences.

The ontological structure of the minimal sense of self that is the result of the subject attached with the unique first-personal perspective would be the same in a particular moment, even if the experiential object is different. It implies that the minimal sense of self which we get through these experiences, and the self-awareness that comes through this first-person perspective seems to create a rigid ontological structure. Conclusively, it seems that the minimal sense of self does not have free will.

3. Locating Free Will in Minimal Sense of Self

The argument in the last section demonstrates a rigid structure in the minimal sense of self, and to show free will in this framework, we have to trace the fragile link, at least where one can imagine the possibility of experiencing the otherwise, or a sense of moral agent where one can negate the present activity.

The clue to finding a fragile linklies in Gallagher's[13] distinction within the framework of the minimal sense of self. He differentiates between 'sense of agency' and 'sense of ownership'. He explains "sense of agencyasthe sense that I am the one who is causing

or generating an action. For example, the sense that I am the one who is causing something to move, or that I am the one who is generating a certain thought in my stream of consciousness. Similarly, he states about the sense of ownership as the sense that I am the one who is undergoing an experience. For example, the sense that my body is moving regardless of whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary[14]."

The given definition about the sense of action tells us that we not only have a sense of a *subject* doing that particular activity but there *seems* a second-order belief which causes me to believe that I am doing that activity. The definition of ownership explicates the connection between an experience and its belongingness to the same experiencer. I *only* can have a feeling of doing something when I have content with that doing. In this sense, though they occur together, it seems that the sense of ownership has priority over the sense of agency. This distinction becomes very clear in the case of the unwilling act. There is an act that is happening in me, and I have the sense of ownership of this experience with the feeling that I initiate and participate in that experience without wanting to do that. This suggests that in each form of experience we have the possibility of affirming our willingness and unwillingness. The very possibility of creating this bifurcation in every experience leads to the emergence of the seeds of free will.

The most basic sense of self, as M. Henry suggests, is the one who is constituted by the very self-givenness of experience[15]. Zahavi concludes that the self is not something that stands opposed to the stream of consciousness, but is, rather immersed in conscious life: it is an integral part of its structure[16]. If this is the case, as we have already seen, the minimal sense of self occurs in the pre-reflective self-awareness. It implies that the distinction mentioned above between willingness and unwillingness occurs in *this* stage. conclusively, the sense of differentiating between willingness and unwillingness is not a second-order activity, but it is an integral part of that experience itself.

The distinction between willingness and unwillingness becomes significant in the structure of a minimal sense of self because we seek to experience otherwise. If we find a possibility to act in experiencing things differently, we genuinely think we have freedom in the structure of the minimal sense of self. Earlier, it seems to us that the distinction we derive from Gallagher's differentiation is a second-order activity. However, Zahavi's inclusion of all the experiences in one stream of consciousness brings them into pre-reflective self-awareness which is in the first order.

Therefore, the seeds of free will are not something in the reflective self, but they are in the minimal sense of self. It appeared that there is a fixed structure in the experience, but this same experience also consists of this possibility of making this distinction, thus, it creates fragility in the *fixed* structure of experience (because it cannot be both p and –p at the same time, and to just disprove p, I need only one instance of –p within the

framework of p).

Harry Frankfurt argues that until we have only first-order effective desire we are not free when we reflect over these first-order desires and can have control over them, we exercise free will[17]. When we talk about self, people generally talk about it in two different senses. Sartre differentiates between two senses of self, pre-reflective self, and reflective self. In the reflective self, the prior experience becomes the object of the experience and one may have a possibility to choose it or not. Sartre's suggestion where we have one-level experience and in reflective self has the second-level experience, though in the stream of consciousness pre-reflective self in primal, explicates that we have no control over the one-level experience, but can have control in second-level experience. It comes close to Frankfurt's suggestions, but finding similarities between Frankfurt and Sartre is not the aim of the present paper, so we will not go into details about that.

Let us explicate it further in cosmos temporality. In the passing time, one is capable of experiencing an event at a particular time, and to say the otherwise would be logically impossible. So, to make it concrete, Dristi is watching me at t and when she watches me at t^1, though the intentional matter is the same, but within the time framework of t^1 it again becomes the first order experience. The same is applicable to the reflective self. Though the object of experience is changed, and the experience of that object becomes the object yet in another particular time, it, too becomes a first-order experience. So, all our experiences are first-level experiences including our reflection over prior experience where we get the minimal sense of self. On the reflective level, I can enjoy free will as Frankfurt puts it. All our reflective experiences are first-level experiences in the linear passage of time. Therefore, we enjoy free will in the first-order experience.

One may still ask that though one can differentiate between willing experience and unwilling experience, yet how is it going to change the fixed first-personal perspective structure where an agent is in a determinate relationship with the experience. Shaun Gallagher's distinction shows that 'sense of agency' and 'sense of ownership' are not over and above the particular experience, but they are an inherent part of the experience, as we have alreadydemonstrated above. Similarly when we have a sense of the experience which we are undergoing, at the same time we *have a* feeling of willing and unwilling experience, which means that willingness and unwillingness are also an inherent part of the experience. So, if we are undergoing an experience of an object with willingness, the *intentional quality* of the experience would be different from the experience of the same object with unwillingness, say, an experience of when we were invited to eat pizza and we *are willing*, and the other experience when we *are unwilling*. Free will lies in the possibility of getting an alternative and choosing one of these alternatives. If there is an alternative, there is no fixed structure in which one has to

experience. Therefore, the same structure which seems to be fixed is *not* rigid but depends upon some other factors which are an inherent part of the experience itself. What else can be other factors are not the subject matter of this paper that can be well dealt with in other research papers.

Notes

[1] See, Harry Frankfurt and Daniel Dennett

[2] Chomsky, Noam. *Manifacturing Consent*

[3] Chalmers explicates that having an experience is automatically to stand in epistemic relation to experience, a relation more primitive than knowledge that might be called "acquaintance". Chalmers, D.J. *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 197.

[4] Zahavi, Dan. *Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-person Perspective,* Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006, pp. 146.

[5] Zahavi, *Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy and Shame*, p.22

[6] Zahavi, *Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy and Shame*, p.22

[7] Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective*, p.125

[8] In this context, one can see freedom in two senses- Freedom *in* self and Freedom *of* self. Though I do not concern with the latter part, so I will be more focused on the former one. What is a possible question can come when we talk about freedom *in* self is that is there any possibility to establish free will in the notion of minimal self itself conceptually? This is more related to the notion of free will, but the latter is more concerned with freedom. I can do otherwise.

[9] Nagel, Thomas. 'What is like to be a bat?' *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 83, No. 4. (Oct., 1974), pp. 435-450.

[10] Ibid, pp. 123.

[11] The intention of this diagram to show the two different kinds of relation in the same experience which, I am quite aware, is not a new one. But I am sure it was implicit. The *R* shows the fixed relation between subject and the experience itself. I am interested in this relationship.

[12] To know more, see, Dennett's *Elbow Room* (1984) &*Just Deserts: Debating Free Will* (2021)

[13] Gallagher considers the notion of minimal self in these terms- if all of the unessential features of self are stripped away, we still have an intuition that there is a basic, immediate, or primitive 'something' that we are willing to call a self. Gallagher, Shaun. 'Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science', *Trends in Cognitive Science* 4/1, 14–21.

[14] Ibid, pp. 15.

[15] Henry, M. *L'essence de la manifestation.* Paris: PUF, (1963), pp. 53.

[16] Ibid, pp. 125.

[17] Frankfurt, Harry. 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person', The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan. 14, 1971), pp. 5-20

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